



**Friends and Interests:  
China's Distinctive Links with Africa**

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## Abstract

China's presence in and other links to Africa have expanded greatly during the current decade. An international discourse that has emerged with this expansion focuses on how to characterize China-Africa relations and ranges from presenting China as the new colonialist to depicting her as Africa's benefactor. Not unexpectedly, Western (especially US and UK) political forces and media are China's chief accusers, while the PRC, with substantial support from Africans, has mounted a spirited, if not always unfeigning, defense. The presentation will use a comparative perspective to examine two sets of factors that make China's links with Africa distinctive: the China Model & Beijing Consensus and Aid & Migration. It will argue that the differing ways in which China's links have developed with Africa make the PRC appear as the distinctly lesser evil in comparison with the West, particularly with regard to questions vital to Africa's development and African dignity.

“Between countries, there are no friends, only interests.”

Senegalese President Aboudoulaye Wade, paraphrasing Lord Palmerston, in a 2005 letter to Pres. Chen Shui-bian, announcing Senegal’s de-recognition of Taiwan and establishment of diplomatic relations with China.<sup>1</sup>

“. . . China has no friends, only interests.”

African diplomat, commenting on Pres. Hu Jintao’s 2004 visit to oil- rich Gabon.<sup>2</sup>

In early 2006, an unacknowledged exchange occurred between the US Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and PRC government on how to characterize China’s policies in Africa. A CFR report, aimed at determining how US influence in Africa can be enhanced, devoted a chapter to China, charging that it protects “rogue states” like Zimbabwe and Sudan, deploys its influence to counter Western pressures on African states to improve human rights and governance, and unfairly competes with US firms in bids for contracts in Africa, the same points already made by veteran critics of China in the US Congress.<sup>3</sup>

China’s elites have long regarded the CFR as a “superpower brain-trust” and “invisible government” shaping the US global role<sup>4</sup> and responded quickly in a paper that argued China has forged “a new type of strategic partnership with Africa that features political equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural exchange.”<sup>5</sup> China was said to support Africa’s desire for a more democratic international order. The paper alluded to the African Human Resources Development Fund, jointly run by six PRC

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<sup>1</sup> Chang Yun-ping and Ko Shu-ling, “Taiwan Foreign Minister Offers to Quit Over Senegal’s Severance of Ties,” *Taipei Times*, 27 Oct. 2005. Queen Victoria criticized her Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston for expressing sympathy for Poles seeking independence from Britain’s ally Russia. He replied, “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” *Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates*, 3d ser., vol. 97, col. 122 (1 Mar. 1848). Ironically, Palmerston is best known in China for prosecuting the Opium War of 1839-1842.

<sup>2</sup> Allen Cheng, “Thirst for Oil Knows No Bounds,” *South China Morning Post* (SCMP), 26 June 2004:5.

<sup>3</sup> CFR, *More than Humanitarianism: a Strategic U.S. Approach Toward Africa*, 2005, [www.cfr.org/publication/9302/49-52](http://www.cfr.org/publication/9302/49-52). See, e.g., the statement of Christopher Smith (R-IL) in “China’s Influence in Africa,” Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Africa, 28 July 2005, [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa22658.000/hfa22658\\_0.HTM](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa22658.000/hfa22658_0.HTM).

<sup>4</sup> David Shambaugh, *Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972-1990* (Princeton: Princeton University Press):195, 197.

<sup>5</sup> PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China’s African Policy,” *People’s Daily* (PD), 12 Jan. 2006, [http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20060112\\_234894.html](http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20060112_234894.html).

ministries, training 16,000 Africans in 2001-2006,<sup>6</sup> the China-Africa Cooperation Forum (CACF), which brought African and PRC ministers to Beijing in 2000 and Addis Ababa in 2003 and will convene heads of state in Beijing in November, 2006,<sup>7</sup> and its subsidiary Program for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development and Addis Ababa Action Plan of 2004-2006, involving a wide range of development projects<sup>8</sup>

The CFR report and PRC paper present single-minded visions. One Western stock idea about China is that “In some African countries, it is possible to talk of China’s behavior as a new form of colonialism.”<sup>9</sup> The CFR panel fosters this notion by presenting PRC actions as deleterious to African interests in ways that it does not acknowledge with regard to the West: it singles out China’s activities as uniquely supportive of illiberal regimes and harmful to the environment through purchases of illegal African timber. Elsewhere, China is accused of especially promoting corruption in Africa and trading in ways that damage African anti-poverty efforts.<sup>10</sup> Several Western powers, however, have long supported authoritarian regimes in Africa, as Taiwan does with states that recognize

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<sup>6</sup> “China: Support for NEPAD,” 2003, [www.un.org/esa/africa/support/China.htm](http://www.un.org/esa/africa/support/China.htm); Liu Guijin, “China-Africa Relations: Equality, Cooperation and Mutual Development,” speech, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria, South Africa, 9 Nov. 2004, [www.iss.co.za/SEMINARS/2004/0911chinaspeech.pdf](http://www.iss.co.za/SEMINARS/2004/0911chinaspeech.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> *Zhong Fei hezuo luntan: Beijing 2000 nian buchangji huiyi jian hui bian* (China-Africa Cooperation Forum: document compilation from Beijing 2000 ministerial-level conference) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2001); CACF, “2d Ministerial Conference,” [www.focac.org/eng/gylt/dejzbzhy/default.htm](http://www.focac.org/eng/gylt/dejzbzhy/default.htm).

<sup>8</sup> *Program for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic & Social Development*, 17 Nov. 2000, [www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15777.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15777.htm); “47 Countries Expected to Attend Sino-African Forum,” *PD*, 28 Nov. 2003, [http://english1.people.com.cn/200311/28/eng20031128\\_129210.shtml](http://english1.people.com.cn/200311/28/eng20031128_129210.shtml).

<sup>9</sup> Johan Norberg, “China Paranoia Derails Free Trade,” *Far Eastern Economic Review* 169:1 (2006):46-49. See, e.g. Jean-Christophe Servant, “China’s Trade Safari in Africa,” *Le Monde Diplomatique* (May 2005), <http://mondediplo.com/2005/05/11chinafrica>. Zimbabwe’s US-funded opposition also speaks of Chinese colonialism. “On Becoming a Chinese Colony,” Sokwanele Special Report (2005), [www.swradioafrica.com/pages/chinese\\_colony.htm](http://www.swradioafrica.com/pages/chinese_colony.htm).

<sup>10</sup> Princeton Lyman, “China’s Rising Role in Africa: Presentation to the US-China Commission, 21 July 2005,” [www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written\\_testimonies/05\\_07\\_21\\_22wrts/lyman\\_princeton\\_wrts.pdf](http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_07_21_22wrts/lyman_princeton_wrts.pdf); Cyril Widdershoven, “Chinese Quest for Crude Increases Focus on Africa,” *Energy Security*, 15 Nov. 2004, [www.iags.org/n1115004](http://www.iags.org/n1115004).

it, rather than the PRC.<sup>11</sup> The most-praised US ally in Africa, Yoweri Museveni, for example, incarnates “competitive authoritarianism,” having tried his main opponent for rape and treason and changed the constitution to continue in office after 20 years as Uganda’s President.<sup>12</sup> While PRC support for Sudan and Zimbabwe is much discussed in the West,<sup>13</sup> less is said about US support for authoritarian African states, especially oil producers such as Gabon, Cameroon, Angola, Chad and Equatorial Guinea,<sup>14</sup> support that extends even to Sudan through US-Sudan intelligence cooperation.<sup>15</sup>

There is no indication African regimes have become more corrupt since China’s presence began to rise around 2000.<sup>16</sup> Both China and the EU are large purchasers of illegal African timber and it is Western pharmaceutical companies that engage in bio-piracy in Africa.<sup>17</sup> PRC exports compete with African exports almost solely in the textile/clothing sector and 60% of China’s exports are in fact produced by foreign-owned companies. Cheap PRC-made household goods, brought into Africa by both Chinese and Africans, may inhibit African light industry formation and thus harm a section of the poor

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<sup>11</sup> See “Chinese Walls,” *Africa Confidential* 46:2 (2005):8 and Robert Kaplan, “America’s African Rifles,” *Atlantic* (Apr. 2005):91-94 on Taiwan and US support for Chad’s authoritarian regime.

<sup>12</sup> David Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2006); Steven Levitsky, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism” *Journal of Democracy* 13:2 (2002):51-65; Michela Wrong, “Why Africa is Angry,” *New Statesman* (NS), 12 Dec. 2005:18;

“Democracy or Dictatorship?: Museveni’s Reelection in Uganda,” *Economist*, 4 Mar. 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Stephanie Giry, “China’s Africa Strategy,” *New Republic*, 15 Nov. 2004:19-23; Michael Wines, “From Shoes to Aircraft to Investment, Zimbabwe Pursues a Made-in-China Future,” *New York Times* (NYT), 24 July 2005:10.

<sup>14</sup> Michael Peel, “Trade Union,” *New Republic*, 7 Apr. 2003:19-20; Max Liniger-Goumaz, *The United States, France and Equatorial Guinea: the Dubious ‘Friendships’* (Geneva: Les Editions du Temps, 1997).

<sup>15</sup> “It’ll Do What it Can Get Away With,” *Economist*, 3 Dec. 2005:24-26; Johann Hari, “The Century’s First Genocide is Nearly Over,” *Independent*, 4 Oct. 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Chen Xiaobao, et al, *China and India: What’s in it for Africa?* Draft paper, OECD Development Centre, Nov. 2005:29, [www.wvz.unibas.ch/forschung/dokumente/ws0506/Reisen\\_CI%20-%20What's%20in%20it%20for%20Africa%20-%20Draft%200711.pdf](http://www.wvz.unibas.ch/forschung/dokumente/ws0506/Reisen_CI%20-%20What's%20in%20it%20for%20Africa%20-%20Draft%200711.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Tina Butler, “Growing Pains and Growing Alliances: China, Timber and Africa,” 20 Apr. 2005, [http://news.mongabay.com/2005.com/2005/0420x-tina\\_butler.html](http://news.mongabay.com/2005.com/2005/0420x-tina_butler.html); World Wildlife Fund, *Failing the Forests: Europe’s Illegal Timber Trade*, 22 Nov. 2005, [www.illegal-logging.info/textonly/papers/fo\\_failingforests.pdf](http://www.illegal-logging.info/textonly/papers/fo_failingforests.pdf); Pusch Commey, “Biopiracy: the New Scramble for Africa,” *New African* (21 Dec. 2003), [http://mpelembe.mappibiz.com/archives\\_05/Biopiracy.html](http://mpelembe.mappibiz.com/archives_05/Biopiracy.html).

as potential producers. Yet machinery, electronic equipment and “high- and new-tech products” made up nearly half of China’s 2005 exports to Africa<sup>18</sup> and because PRC goods are much cheaper than Western imports and many local products, they do benefit wider sections of the poor as consumers.<sup>19</sup> In any case, African industrialization was already severely damaged by Western imports following 1980s and 1990s International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank structural adjustment programs (SAP’s).<sup>20</sup>

In its paper, the PRC presented its policies as benign opposites of the West ignoring African aspirations for a more equitable international distribution of wealth and power. It eschewed, however, the obligation of states to vindicate the rights of especially oppressed people<sup>21</sup> and indicated China will forge bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in Africa, following the West’s path of going beyond WTO requirements to open developing states to even higher levels of penetration by overwhelming external economic forces.<sup>22</sup>

Given the asymmetries of US-China relations, the CFR report is predictably accusatory and the PRC paper defensive. The report in fact represents a common discursive binarism

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<sup>18</sup> David Barboza, “Some Assembly Needed: China as Asia Factory,” NYT, 9 Feb. 2006:B1; “China to Promote Trade, Economic Links with African Countries in 2006,” Xinhua, 7 Jan. 2006.

<sup>19</sup> “Africa a Frontier of Opportunity for Expanding China,” Associated Press, 8 Feb. 2006; Chris Edwards and Rhys Jenkins, *The Effect of China and India’s Growth and Trade Liberalisation on Poverty in Africa*, UK Department of International Development, 2005, [www.eldis.org/static/DOC19251.htm](http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC19251.htm); Jane Kennan and Christopher Stevens, *Opening the Package: the Asian Drivers and Poor-Country Trade*, Institute of Development Studies (Sussex: IDS 2005), [www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/pdfs/CSAsian%20DriversTrade.pdf](http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/pdfs/CSAsian%20DriversTrade.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> Claire Melamed, *The Economics of Failure: the Real Cost of ‘Free’ Trade for Poor Countries* (London: Christian Aid: 2005); [www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/506liberalisation/Economics%20of%20failure.pdf](http://www.christian-aid.org.uk/indepth/506liberalisation/Economics%20of%20failure.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> “Beijing Shrugs Off Claim of Helping ‘Rogue States,’” *SCMP*, 13 Jan. 2006; Lu Guozeng, “Deepening Friendly Cooperation and Achieving Mutual Benefits and Win-Win Results,” 12 Jan. 2006, [www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjzb/zzjg/fzs/xwlb/t231204.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjzb/zzjg/fzs/xwlb/t231204.htm).

<sup>22</sup> Both China and the US are seeking FTA’s with the Southern African Customs Union. Peter Draper & Garth le Pere (eds.), *Enter the Dragon – Towards a Free Trade Agreement Between China and the Southern African Customs Union* (Johannesburg: SIIA 2005); R. Cockayne, “SACU Needs Free Trade Agreement with the US,” 12 June 2005, [www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=4324](http://www.tralac.org/scripts/content.php?id=4324). Bilateral FTAs weaken poor countries’ power in multilateral trade negotiations by fragmenting their coalitions and also harm third parties. Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvin Panagariya, “Bilateral Trade Treaties are a Sham,” *Financial Times* (FT), 13 July 2003: 17; Scott McDonald and Terry Walmsley, *Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions: the Impact of the EU/Republic of South Africa Free Trade Agreement on Botswana*, 2003, <http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/gtaworkpp/1644.htm>.

about China's Africa policies, exemplified by a German foundation's ad for its panel on "China in Africa" at the NGO forum of WTO's 2005 ministerial meeting, which queried

Are China-Africa trade & investment relations following a pattern of South-South cooperation, guided by development needs of both sides? Or are [they] just replications of the classical North-South model, where Africa's hope of building a manufacturing sector gets another beating? Will the Chinese 'no political strings attached' approach help the African development state regain posture or is it a recipe for closed-door business with autocrats to get a competitive edge over Western economic interests . . .<sup>23</sup>

PRC Africa policies should not however be reduced to either "China is the best" or "China is just like the rest." The PRC is a trade-driven industrial power integrated into the world system and practices a *realpolitik* of aggrandizing national wealth and power.<sup>24</sup>

It thus necessarily presents to Africa a "neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics"<sup>25</sup> that replicates in key ways developed state policies of disadvantageous terms of trade, exploitation of natural resources, oppressive labor regimes and support for authoritarian rulers. The commonalities of the PRC and Western approaches are therefore fundamental.

There are however distinctive features of China-Africa linkages that stem from the country's semi-colonial and socialist legacies and its status as a developing country. They derive as well from China's late entry into Africa as a resource-seeking state, in the midst of a decades-long decline in African fortunes associated with the privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and austerity policies that comprise the Washington Consensus (WC).<sup>26</sup> This paper concentrates on two distinctive sets of China-Africa links that contrast with what the West has had on offer through the WC and Post-Washington

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<sup>23</sup> Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), "Panel on: 'China in Africa: focus on trade and investment.'" Leaflet distributed at WTO NGO forum, Hong Kong, 13 Dec. 2005.

<sup>24</sup> Thomas Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs* 75:5 (1996):37-53; Guang Lei, "Realpolitik Nationalism: International Sources of Chinese Nationalism," *Modern China*. 31:4 (2005):487-514.

<sup>25</sup> David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005):120-151.

<sup>26</sup> Jan Teunissen & Age Akkerman (eds), *Diversity in Development: Reconsidering the Washington Consensus* (Hague: FONAD, 2004); AKN Ahmed, *Washington Consensus: How and Why it Failed the Poor* (Dhaka: Shahitya Prakash 2004); Robin Broad, "The Washington Consensus Meets the Global Backlash: Shifting Debates and Policies," *Globalizations* 1:2 (2004):129-154.

Consensus (PWC),<sup>27</sup> and make China's soft power effort a loadstone for attracting the continent's political and intellectual elite. One set is described in terms of the "Beijing Consensus" (BC), an "ideology" within neo-liberal parameters that nevertheless takes seriously some aspirations of developing states often ignored or opposed by the West. The other set involves China-Africa aid and migration links which, unlike those of the West, are often seen by Africans as not exclusively serving foreign and elite interests.

PRC leaders are usually depicted as having an instrumental approach to dealings with foreigners and are said to have interests, but no friends abroad.<sup>28</sup> The distinctive features of its links with Africa, however, often position China as a perceived lesser evil among great powers interacting with the continent. That perception may allow Chinese leaders to make good on their claim to have Africans among their "all-weather friends."<sup>29</sup>

#### China in Africa: the "Model" in Context

Post-colonial Africa is often understood as burdened by civil wars, epidemics, and venal regimes that aggravate endemic poverty, a perception that led to a post-Cold War Afro-pessimism or even Afrophobia<sup>30</sup> and to Africa's downgrading as a concern for

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<sup>27</sup> Ben Fine & Jomo K.S., *The New Development Economics: Post Washington Consensus Neoliberal Thinking* (London: Zed 2005); Ziya Onis & Filkre Senses, "Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus," *Development and Change*, 36:2 (2005):263-290. The PWC adds to the WC's neo-liberal program, a discourse that relates it to democracy, good governance, and poverty reduction.

<sup>28</sup> Andreas Lorenz, "A Technocrat Riding a Wild Tiger," *Der Spiegel*, no. 45 (10 Nov. 2005), [www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,384155,00.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,384155,00.html).

<sup>29</sup> Liu Guijin, "All-Weather Friends in Need and Indeed: China-Africa Relations Seen from the Eyes of a Chinese Diplomat," *African Renaissance*, July/Aug. 2005:10-19. See also Ian Taylor, "The 'All-Weather Friend?' Sino-African Interaction in the Twenty-first Century," in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds.), *Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent* (London: Routledge, 2004):83-101. Some African leaders term China an "all-weather friend." Paul Mooney, "China's African Safari," *Yale Global*, 3 Jan. 2005, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=5106>; PRC Foreign Ministry, "Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Zonghuai Meets with Konare, Chairperson of the African Union Commission," 4 July 2005, [www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyhd/t202524.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zygy/gyhd/t202524.htm).

<sup>30</sup> David Rieff, "In Defense of Afro-Pessimism," *World Policy Journal* 15:4 (1998):10-22; "America Loses its Afrophobia," *Economist* (26 Apr. 1997):23-24.



developed world policy-makers and investors.<sup>31</sup> In part because of China's increased presence, which began in the 1990s when China-Africa trade grew by 700%, Western leaders are again giving some attention to the continent. Yet, even as China's activities increasingly displace traditional British, French and US interests, many Africans still find Africa "remains all but invisible," particularly to the US.<sup>32</sup> That is so even though it is the second largest continent, with the fastest-growing population: it had 900 million (m) people in 2005 and may reach 1.3 billion (b) by 2020, when China and Africa will each have 20% of the world's people.<sup>33</sup> Africa's economy is growing slowly in per capita terms, but population growth may double its size in a generation.

Africa is also the most resource-laden continent, with every primary product required for industrial production. It accounted for more than 10m of a global 84m barrels per day (bpd) oil production in 2005. Most is light, sweet, highly profitable crude, mainly offshore, away from politics. Some 85% of the world's new oil reserves found in 2001-2004 were on west/central African coasts. There is strong competition to secure African oil. The US imported 60% of its 20m bpd of oil used in 2005, 16% from Africa, a figure expected to rise to 25% by 2015 and its government works closely with US companies to boost access to the continent's oil.<sup>34</sup> China imported 40% of the 7.2m bpd of oil it used in

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<sup>31</sup> Stefan Andreasson, "Orientalism and African Development Studies: the 'Reductive Repetition' Motif in Theories of African Underdevelopment," *Third World Quarterly* (TWQ) 26:6 (2005):971-986.

<sup>32</sup> Z. Jaffer, "US Election and the World," *Yale Global*, 15 Nov. 2004, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4868>; Esther Pan, "China, Africa and Oil," CFR, 12 Jan. 2006, [www.cfr.org/publication/9557/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/); "Hopes, Fears Rise as China Quickens Africa Push," Reuters, 14 Dec. 2005.

<sup>33</sup> "Ethiopia: Country Second Most Populous in Africa," *Ethiopian Herald*, in *Africa News* (AN), 13 Oct. 2005; "Africans say Elite Power Brokers Ignored Them," Inter Press Service (IPS), 27 Jan. 2003.

<sup>34</sup> Richard Akinjide, "Africa, China and Oil and Gas Supplies," *Alexander's Gas & Oil Connections* 10:17 (15 Sept. 2005), [www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nta53701.htm](http://www.gasandoil.com/goc/news/nta53701.htm); "Prepared Remarks of Sec. of Energy Samuel Bodman at the Corporate Council on Africa's 2005 Africa Oil and Gas Forum," Federal News Service, 1 Dec. 2005; US Dept. of Energy, "U.S. Petroleum Imports and Exports," Oct. 2004, [www.eia.doe.gov/oil\\_gas/petroleum/info\\_glance/importexport.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/info_glance/importexport.html); Jaffer 2004; US State Dept., "Africa Central to US Private Sector Oil and Gas Agenda," States News Service, 30 Nov. 2005; Don Lee, "China Making Big Oil Moves," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 Jan. 2006. By 2030, China is expected to import 60% of the oil;

2005, 30% from Africa. More than 60% of the oil production of Sudan, Africa's third largest producer, goes to China and supplies 5% of PRC oil needs. Angola, the second largest producer, sends a quarter of its production to China, as does Nigeria, the largest producer. In 2005, a PRC oil firm announced it would invest US\$2.3b in an oil and gas field off Nigeria. China too carries out vigorous "oil diplomacy" in Africa.<sup>35</sup>

Before the 1990s, PRC Africa policy was purely political: China fostered anti-colonial and post-colonial solidarity,<sup>36</sup> efforts repaid through most African states' recognition of the PRC.<sup>37</sup> The symbol of China-Africa links from the 1960s to 1980s was Tazara, the Tanzania-Zambia railway built by 50,000 Chinese.<sup>38</sup> China's practice then of supporting developing state initiatives and providing aid that did not enrich elites still resonates with Africans today. Since the 1990s, PRC activism on behalf of developing states has waned however and much of China's activity in Africa is now profit-centered.<sup>39</sup>

There were 750 Chinese enterprises in Africa in 2005.<sup>40</sup> While a growing presence, they account for a tiny part of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2004, PRC entities

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"Premier Taps into African Oil Fields," *Foreign Direct Investment*, 9 Aug. 2004, [www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/802/Premier\\_taps\\_into\\_African\\_oilfields.html](http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/802/Premier_taps_into_African_oilfields.html).

<sup>35</sup> "China Muscles in to Africa Oil Scramble," Reuters, 15 Dec. 2005; Pan 2006; Joel Konopo, "Chinese Economy Stimulates African Markets," *Reporter* (Botswana), in AN, 21 Feb. 2005; Yitzhak Sichor, "Sudan: China's Outpost in Africa," *China Brief* (CB) 5:21 (2005):9-11; Lai Hongyi, *China's Regional Oil Diplomacy (I): Middle East and Africa* (Singapore: East Asia Institute, 2005).

<sup>36</sup> Alaba Ogunsanwo Alaba, *China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974); Alan Hutchinson, *China's African Revolution* (Boulder: Westview, 1976); G.P. Deshpande & H.K. Gupta, *United Front against Imperialism: China's Foreign Policy in Africa* (Bombay: Somaiya, 1986).

<sup>37</sup> Jude-Cyprian Nwugo, *African Responses to an Issue of Disputed Representation in the United Nations* (PhD diss., Howard University, 1977); "Diplomatic Ties between China and African Countries" *Beijing Review* 43:41 (9 Oct. 2000):23-24.

<sup>38</sup> Richard Hall & Hugh Peyman, *The Great Uhuru Railway: China's Showpiece in Africa* (New York: Gollancz, 1976); George Yu, *China's Africa Policy: a Study of Tanzania* (New York: Praeger, 1975); Jamie Monson, "Freedom Railway," *Boston Review* (Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005), [www.bostonreview.net/BR29.6/monson.html](http://www.bostonreview.net/BR29.6/monson.html).

<sup>39</sup> "Forget Mao, Let's Do Business," *Economist* 7 Feb. 2004; Chris Alden, "China in Africa," *Survival* 47:3 (2005):147-164; Chen Zongde, *Feizhou jingji quan yu Zhongguo qiye* (Africa's globalization and China's industry) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 2001); Ian Taylor, "China's Foreign Policy Toward Africa in the 1990s," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 36:3 (1998):443-460.

<sup>40</sup> "China's Africa Expansion," United Press International (UPI), 17 Jan. 2006.

invested \$135m in Africa and in the first ten months of 2005, \$175m (of China's \$3.6b and \$6.9b in outward investment). Africa's average annual FDI intake in 2001-2004 was \$15-18b, despite Africa providing the world's highest returns on FDI, averaging 29% in the 1990s and 40% in 2005. FDI in Africa jumped in 2005 to \$29b (of \$897b in global FDI), but China's realized FDI in Africa stood at only \$1b of Africa's \$96b, two-thirds of which is European (half British or French) and one-fifth North American. PRC Africa investment is also concentrated; in 2005, \$316m was in Zambia and \$230m in S. Africa. Based on planned investments, however, China may become one of Africa's top three FDI providers in five years. PRC trade with Africa was also a tiny part of her 2005 \$1.4 trillion world trade, but it is fast growing. Only \$10b in 2000, it was \$39b in 2005 (with an overall balance slightly in Africa's favor), a total not far short of the US's \$44b 2004 trade with Africa and almost a tenth of Africa's \$435b world trade (70% of it with the EU). China is now the third largest trader with Africa, after the US and France.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> "China and Africa Enjoy Bright Prospect of Mutual Investment," *PD*, 12 Jan. 2006, [http://english.people.com.cn/200601/12/print20060112\\_234994.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200601/12/print20060112_234994.html); "New Highlights in China-Africa Comprehensive Cooperation," Xinhua, 13 Jan. 2006; "China's Direct Investment Overseas Rises to US\$6.9b," *China Daily* (CD), 23 Jan. 2006; UN Office of the Special Advisor for Africa, "Resources Flows to Africa: an Update on Statistical Trends" (2005), [www.un.org/africa/osaa](http://www.un.org/africa/osaa); UNCTAD, "Data Show Foreign Direct Investment Climbed Sharply in 2005," [www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid+6733&intItemID=1528&lang=1](http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid+6733&intItemID=1528&lang=1); "Sino-Zambian Trade and Economic Cooperation Showing Positive Momentum in 2005," Xinhua, 28 Jan. 2006; B. Schoonaker, "SA Gets No Sympathy from China," *Sunday Times* (S. Africa), 9 Oct. 2005:9; "Into Africa: Doing Business on the Forgotten Continent," *AMplify Wharton*, 2003, <http://exced-web.wharton.upenn.edu/Amplify/0312/amperspective.html>; Ernest Harsch, "Foreign Investment on Africa's Agenda," *African Recovery* 17:2 (2003):12-16; Konopo 2005; David Shinn and Joshua Eisenman, "Dueling Priorities for Beijing in the Horn of Africa," *CB* 5:21 (2005):6-9; "A New Scramble," *Economist*, 27 Nov. 2004:84-85; Stephen Thomsen, *Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: the Private-Sector Response to Improved Governance*, Chatham House IEP Briefing Paper 05/06 (2005), [www.riia.org/pdf/research/ie/BPafrica-fdi.pdf](http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/ie/BPafrica-fdi.pdf); "Foreign Trade Amounts to \$1.4 Trillion in 2005," Xinhua, 11 Jan. 2006; Robert Sutter, "China is on the Rise . . ." *Yale Global*, 22 Apr. 2005, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5612>; WTO, "Developing countries' Goods' Trade Share Surges to 50-Year Peak," [www.wto.org/english/news\\_c/pres\\_05\\_e/pr401\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_c/pres_05_e/pr401_e.htm); John Fraser, "Africa May Find EU Perk a Poisoned Chalice," *Business Day* (BD) (S. Africa), 23 May 2003; Pan 2006.

In the 1970s, Africa's share of world trade was 5%; in 2005 it was only 1.5%.<sup>42</sup> In the 1980s, Africa received 30% of world FDI; in 2003 it was 7%. China-Africa investment and trade links however have increased dramatically<sup>43</sup> and PRC and African analysts contend that eases Africa's dependence on the West.<sup>44</sup> The UN Development Program agrees and underwrites a China-Africa Business Council in Beijing that plans to set up offices in six African states.<sup>45</sup> Many Africans also understand China's political economy to have attributes that differ from those of the West in ways that matter to Africa. Talk of a "Chinese model" is common in such African states Nigeria, Ethiopia, and S. Africa.<sup>46</sup>

While some analysts argue most facets of the erstwhile "Chinese model" do not apply to Africa,<sup>47</sup> African elites often find aspects appealing. The African Development Bank's president has said of the Chinese that "we can learn from them how to organize our trade policy, to move from low to middle income status, to educate our children in skills and areas that pay off in just a couple years."<sup>48</sup> A Nigerian journalist argues

[T]he Chinese government knows what is good for its people and therefore shapes its economic strategy accordingly. Its strategy is not informed by the Washington Consensus. China has not allowed any [IMF] or World Bank to impose on it some neo-liberal package of reforms . . . [T]heir strategy has not been a neo-liberal overdose of deregulation, cutting social expenditure, privatizing everything under the sun and jettisoning the public good. They have not branded subsidy a dirty word.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> "Africa Pays the Highest Price for Globalization," Agence France Presse (AFP), 18 Jan. 2006; "2005: Year of Major Strides for Africa," *Herald* (Zimbabwe), in AN, 22 Dec. 2005. China's investment in and trade with Africa are highly complementary. Yong Li, "The Impact of FDI on Trade: Evidence from China's Bilateral Trade," *Journal of the Academy of Business and Economics* 2:2 (2003).

<sup>43</sup> But see Zeng Qiang, "Some Reflections on Expanding Sino-African Trade and Economic Cooperative Relations in the New Century," *Tinabantu* 1:1 (2002):65-71, which cautions against being very optimistic.

<sup>44</sup> "Losing Africa . . .", 2006; Nicole Itano, "Demand and Supply," *Newsday*, 4 Oct. 2005:A37.

<sup>45</sup> Jiang Zuqing, "Equal Chances Urged for Chinese Firms in Africa," CD, 3 Jan. 2006.

<sup>46</sup> "The Long March to China," *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), in AN, 20 Oct. 2005; David Shinn, "China's Approach to East, North and the Horn of Africa," Testimony, US-China Economic & Security Review Commission, 21 July 2005; Interviews with scholars and officials in S. Africa and Ethiopia, summer 2004.

<sup>47</sup> "Meles Zenawi's Balancing Act," *Addis Fortune* (Ethiopia), in AN, 14 Nov. 2004; "No Chance of SA Becoming US's Working Class," BD, in AN, 2 Aug. 2005.

<sup>48</sup> World Economic Forum, "Trade Winds: Chinese Investment in Africa," 26 Jan. 2006, [www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/\\_S16446](http://www.weforum.org/site/knowledgenavigator.nsf/Content/_S16446).

<sup>49</sup> "Can Nigeria be Africa's China?" *This Day* (Nigeria), in AN, 2 Aug. 2005.

African analysts distinguish massive PRC state infrastructure investment and support services from their states' failure to provide these requisites of development and contend the difference results from "strictures imposed by multilateral and bilateral financiers."<sup>50</sup>

Many Africans also distinguish between Chinese and Western investment and trade. When a blogger criticized PRC support for Sudan's regime, other Nigerians responded by contrasting Chinese and Western economic practices in Africa.<sup>51</sup> They and other Africans decry developed states' locking in underdevelopment through detrimental terms of trade and accuse Western firms of destructive ties with Africa -- "buying natural resources and then selling weapons, alcohol and cigarettes"<sup>52</sup> or what is termed "unequal and disparate exchange."<sup>53</sup> Analysts argue China wants Africa's oil, but "the way in which China's demand for oil is framed in the Western media -- in breathy, suspense-filled undertones . . . smacks of racist double standards."<sup>54</sup> Indeed, while three-fourths of US FDI in Africa is in oil, 64% of PRC FDI in Africa from 1979-2000 was in manufacturing and 28% in resources.<sup>55</sup> Lack of infrastructure inhibits FDI and African exports but, with

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<sup>50</sup> "China's Growth Debunks Capitalist Myth," *The Nation* (Kenya), in AN 3 Jan. 2006

<sup>51</sup> "Jewels in the Jungle," 10 Jan. 2006, <http://jewelsinthetjungle.blogspot.com/2006/01/china-in-africa-cnooc-nigerian-oil.html>.

<sup>52</sup> Nico Colombant, "China's New African Oil Ties Create Concerns," Voice of America (VOA), 29 Sept. 2004, <http://energybulletin.net/2340.html>. Studies of unequal exchange have deemed the concept robust empirically. Kristen Williams, "Is 'Unequal Exchange' a Mechanism for Perpetuating Inequality in the Modern World System?" *Studies in Comparative International Development* 20:3 (1985):47-73; Kunibert Raffer, *Unequal Exchange and the Evolution of the World System: Reconsidering the Impact of Trade on North-South Relations* (London: Macmillan 1987); P. Srkar, "The North-South Terms of Trade Debate: a Re-examination," *Progress in Development Studies* 1:4 (2001):309-327.

<sup>53</sup> Peter Custers, "Unequal Exchange and Poverty in African Countries Exporting Primary Commodities," European Conference of People's Global Action, 2 Sept. 2002, [www.nadir.org/nadir/initiav/agp/pgaeurope/leiden/poverty\\_africa.htm](http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiav/agp/pgaeurope/leiden/poverty_africa.htm).

<sup>54</sup> L. Muthoni Wanyeki, "Oil Wars are Coming to Africa," *East African*, in AN, 28 Feb. 2006.

<sup>55</sup> Ian Ferguson, *US Trade & Investment Relations with Sub-Saharan Africa: the AGOA and Beyond* (Washington: CRS, 2003); World Bank Group Africa Region, *Patterns of Asia-Africa Trade & Investment: Potential for Ownership and Partnership* (Tokyo: 2004):63. In a half-dozen major countries, all or almost all US investment is in oil. Richard Knight, "Expanding Petroleum Production in Africa," *ACAS Bulletin* no. 64 (2002). The US has nevertheless criticized China for focusing too much of its investment in Africa in raw materials. "US Watches China's Rising Star with Anxiety," AFP, 27 Jan. 2006.

\$6.3b in construction contracts in 2005, PRC firms are Africa's preeminent infrastructure builders and now often do employ many African workers.<sup>56</sup> A Nigerian official has also noted that "the Western world is never prepared to transfer technology -- but the Chinese do [and] while China's technology may not be as sophisticated as some Western governments', it is better to have Chinese technology than to have none at all."<sup>57</sup>

Even US allies such as Museveni see Africa's "donating" of unprocessed raw materials to the West as allowing a small part of humanity to live well at Africans' expense and contend Africans need investment that will permit them to sell coffee and not just beans, steel and not just iron ore. They regard China's surging demand for African exports -- the PRC share as a destination of such exports rose from 1.3% in 1995 to 9.3% in 2004 -- as aiding that effort.<sup>58</sup> Africans also find PRC goods are cheaper than Western imports and less expensive than even local goods used in construction: an Angolan official has noted that a 50 kilo bag of local cement costs \$10, while China's imported cement costs \$4.<sup>59</sup>

Talk of Chinese colonialism in Africa is thus inapt, but China's practices can be seen as *proto-imperialist*, at least in the simplistic sense of creating requisites of hegemony in some states.<sup>60</sup> "Imperialism" is often "indiscriminately applied to any foreign policy . . .

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<sup>56</sup> A. Singh, "China and Africa: Friend and Foe," *Financial Mail*, 3 Mar. 2006:41; Azita Amjadi and Alexander Yeats, *Have Transport Costs Contributed to Relative Decline of African Exports? Some Preliminary Empirical Evidence* (Washington: World Bank 1995); "President Opens US\$8 Million Luanda General Hospital," Angola Press Agency (APA), in AN, 2 March 2006 (PRC builders used 90% Angolan labor); "Government to Build 200,000 Houses Countrywide Until 2008," APA, in AN, 7 Mar. 2006 (PRC firm uses 80% Angolan labor to build 5,000 apartments).

<sup>57</sup> "Friend or Forager?," *FT*, 23 Feb. 2006:15. An article on a Namibian news site put it that China invests "in long-neglected infrastructure projects and hardly viable industries," "The Chinese are in Africa -- This Time to Stay," *New Era*, in AN 13 Mar. 2006.

<sup>58</sup> "Struggle Toward a Self-Sustaining Economy: Museveni's Labour Day Speech," *New Vision* (Uganda), in AN, 5 May 2005; Chen 2005:29.

<sup>59</sup> John Donnelly, "China Scooping Up Deals in Africa as US Firms Hesitate," *Boston Globe*, 24 Dec. 2005.

<sup>60</sup> Apart from Zimbabwe and Sudan, it is argued China has "overwhelming" influence in Ethiopia. Karby Leggett "China Forges Ties Alliances with War-Torn Nations," *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ), 30 Mar. 2005.

to which the user happens to be opposed,”<sup>61</sup> but is commonly equated with “informal empire,” where a central authority determines a periphery’s external policies and influences its domestic matters.<sup>62</sup> China has begun to do so in a few states; indeed, it does not wholly reject claims that it dominates Zimbabwe, but chalks them up to jealousy.<sup>63</sup> Yet PRC practices do differ in scale from the activities of longstanding practitioners of imperialism. Examples of US and European direct exercises of hegemony in Africa are legion<sup>64</sup> and found as well in efforts organized under through international organizations: it is said the UN Secretary General’s envoy holds the “true power” in Sudan today and that a parallel UN military/civilian establishment issues orders to Sudanese authorities.<sup>65</sup> In contrast, China “allows African countries to vote as they please at the United Nations [and] does not propose to deploy any troops on their territory.”<sup>66</sup>

Other characteristics that Africans attribute to China concern her position in the international system. A South African scholar has noted that China is

the first country from the so-called marginalized developing fold to occupy centre stage in the global political economy. In terms of political ideology and approaches to socio-economic development, China is closely aligned to countries of the south. This has, for many years, shaped China’s relations with countries in Africa and elsewhere

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<sup>61</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 3rd ed., 1960):45.

<sup>62</sup> Alexander Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999):118. See also the definition in the *American Heritage Dictionary* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. 2000): “The policy of extending a nation’s authority by territorial acquisition or by the establishment of economic and political hegemony over other nations.”

<sup>63</sup> “Western Media’s Misreading of China 2005,” *PD*, 15 Dec. 2005, [http://english.people.com.cn/200512/15/print20051215\\_228268.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200512/15/print20051215_228268.html).

<sup>64</sup> See, e.g. Alfred Abisoseh Jarrett, *The Underdevelopment of Africa: Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Socialism* (Lanham: University Press of America 1996); Sarah Milburn, “*Toujours la Chasse Gardee?* French Power and Influence in Late 20<sup>th</sup> Century Francophone Central Africa (c. 1970-1995),” in Edward Rhodes, et al. (eds.), *Presence, Prevention and Persuasion: A Historical Analysis of Military Force and Political Influence* (New York: Lexington Books, 2004):281-376.

<sup>65</sup> Pieter Tesch, “Sudan: a Colony Again,” *NS*, 28 Nov. 2005:28-29.

<sup>66</sup> Francois Lafargue, “China’s Presence in Africa,” *China Perspectives*, no. 61 (2005):2-9. The latter point likely refers to US pressure on the three African UN Security Council members to endorse the war in Iraq. “Tied Aid Strangling Nations, Says UN,” *IPS*, 6 July 2004, [www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=24509](http://www.ipsnews.net/interna.asp?idnews=24509).

and created a somewhat idealistic impression of the distant partner or big brother in the East that is still evident on the continent today.<sup>67</sup>

For many Africans then, there is a “Chinese model,” not just of FDI/export-led rapid industrial expansion,<sup>68</sup> but of a developing state that does not fully implement WC policies. China is seen as more willing than the West to help develop the predicates of industrialism in the global South and to do so at a lower cost to the continent, without imposing what many find to be onerous requirements for African states’ policies. Whether this positive view of a “Chinese model” is warranted is less important than the fact it exists and plays a role in how Africans appraise the policies of developed states. This perception is now part of an image recently labeled the Beijing Consensus.

#### The Beijing Consensus and Africa

China’s self-representation as Africa’s helpmate is often dismissed as propaganda designed to curry favor with African elites. Because however the WC/PWC has a more than two-decade history in Africa,<sup>69</sup> many Africans are disenchanted with Western neo-liberalism and plausibly regard the PRC as an alternative, based on the experiences and needs it shares with Africa. China’s creation of this attractive (although not necessarily accurate) image, now termed the BC, in itself distinguishes China’s links with Africa.

The BC notion was elaborated by Joshua Cooper Ramo, former *Time* magazine foreign affairs editor, Goldman Sachs China advisor, and Qinghua University professor, who is

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<sup>67</sup> Lyal Whi, “A Match Made in Beijing,” *Mail & Guardian* (M&G) (Johannesburg), 20 Jan. 2006.

<sup>68</sup> See He Li, “The Chinese Path of Economic Reform and Its Implications,” *Asian Affairs: an American Review* 31:4 (2005):195-211; Cao Tian Yu (ed.), *The Chinese Model of Modern Development* (New York: Routledge 2005).

<sup>69</sup> Richard Sandbrook, “Africa’s Great Transformation?” *Journal of Development Studies* (JDS) 41:6 (2005): 1118-1125. For critiques of neo-liberalism in Africa, see the essays by Elizabeth Watson, Anne Pitcher, and Jamie Monson in *Africa* 76:1 (2006); Graham Harrison, “Economic Faith, Social Protest and a Misreading of African Society: the Travails of Neoliberalism in Africa,” *TWQ* 26:8 (2005):1302-1320; John Mihevc, *The Market Tells Them So: the World Bank and Economic Fundamentalism in Africa* (London: Zed 1995); Alison Ayers, “Demystifying Democratization: the Global Constitution of (Neo-) Liberal Polities in Africa,” *TWQ* 27:2 (2006):321-338.



now Managing Director of Kissinger Associates. It is often discussed as PRC investments, aid, and trade not being conditioned by the demands made by Western states and international institutions. US neo-conservatives, who are particularly exercised by the BC, have reduced the notion to one of “economic growth without the constraints of democratic institutions” or “economic development without political change.”<sup>70</sup> Others describe it as liberalized trade and finance with strong state leadership<sup>71</sup> or a strong state role in industrial development, but caution toward liberalization and deregulation.<sup>72</sup>

WC/PWC market fundamentalism is about Western prescriptions for the world’s economies and politics and the ordering of global power relations. The BC is about lessons of the articulation of state and economy in China and the PRC approach to international relations. Ramo presents it as a multi-faceted policy set that forefronts constant innovation as a development strategy (instead of a one-size-fits-all neo-liberal orthodoxy) and uses quality-of-life measures, such as equality and environmental (not just GDP) in formulating the strategy. He asserts that it opposes the hierarchy of nations embodied in WC-related institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO.<sup>73</sup> PRC leaders are said to reject “a US-style power, bristling with arms and intolerant of others’

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<sup>70</sup> Larry Wortzel & Devin Stewart, “The US Formula for China,” *Asia Times*, 9 Nov. 2005, [www.cctr.ust.hk/articles/20051109\\_USformula.htm](http://www.cctr.ust.hk/articles/20051109_USformula.htm); Lorne Craner, “Economic Development without Political Liberalization: will the Chinese Model Prevail over the ‘Global March of Freedom?’” American Enterprise Institute panel, Washington, D.C., 14 Dec. 2005, [www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1206/summary](http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1206/summary).

<sup>71</sup> Alert Unit, School of Peace Culture, *Alert 2004: Report on Conflicts, Human Rights, and Peace-Building* (Pau, Spain: Escola de Cultura de Pau, 2004):117.

<sup>72</sup> Michael Dauderstadt & Jurgen Stetten, *China and Globalization* (Bonn: FES 2005): 7.

<sup>73</sup> *The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power* (London: Foreign Policy Centre 2004):11-12. On hierarchy in the IMF, World Bank and WTO, see Ngaire Woods, “The United States and the International Financial Institutions: Power and Influence within the World Bank and the IMF,” in Rosemary Foot (ed.), *U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations: the United States and Multilateral Institutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003):92-114; Branko Milanovic, *Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005):150-151.

world views," in favor of "power based on the example of their own model, the strength of their economic system, and their rigid defense of ... national sovereignty."<sup>74</sup>

Ramo himself cannot be written off as reflexively "pro-China." He is a CFR member and has been declared a "Global Leader of Tomorrow" by the neo-liberal World Economic Forum (WEF), famed for its Davos, Switzerland conclaves of the rich and powerful. Ramo is affiliated with the Tony Blair-founded Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) in London and his book on the BC that it published has been praised by the World Bank.<sup>75</sup> He nonetheless thinks highly enough of the BC to approvingly quote an Indian sociologist who stated that "China's experiment should be the most admired in human history. China has its own path."<sup>76</sup> It is not surprising then that the BC, as Ramo conceives it, is a "model" within the neo-liberal paradigm, but with distinctive features.

China's government denies it touts a model.<sup>77</sup> Asked about Rwanda's development, the PRC Ambassador limited himself to saying that Chinese experience shows Rwanda should encourage local and foreign investment.<sup>78</sup> Yet soon after Ramo coined the BC concept and WEF chair Klaus Schwab contrasted it with the WC at a Beijing conference,<sup>79</sup> a leading PRC economic journal published an article by Ramo.<sup>80</sup> A TV program on his book was telecast in China<sup>81</sup> and his work was circulated to the top 5,000

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<sup>74</sup> Ramo, 2004:37.

<sup>75</sup> Foreign Policy Centre, "China and Globalisation" (July, 2005), <http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/665.pdf>.

<sup>76</sup> Joshua C. Ramo, "China has discovered its own Economic Consensus," FT, 7 May 2004:19.

<sup>77</sup> Howard French, "China Wages Classroom Struggle to Win Friends in Africa," NYT, 20 Nov. 2005:12.

<sup>78</sup> E. Akanga, "China's Economic Development: a Good Lesson for Rwanda," *New Times*, 19 January 2006, [www.new.times.co.rw/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=3072&Itemid=58](http://www.new.times.co.rw/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3072&Itemid=58). Seeking FDI is of course itself a key neo-liberal prescription for developing countries, despite its potential displacement effect on domestic industry. See Nirmal Kumar Chandra, "FDI and Domestic Economy: Neoliberalism in China," *Economic & Political Weekly*, 6 Nov. 1999:3195-3212.

<sup>79</sup> "Beijing Consensus': a China Model," *Renmin Wang*, 31 May 2004, <http://bj.people.com.cn/GB/25527/33619/33784/2534531.html>.

<sup>80</sup> [Joshua Cooper Ramo], "Beijing Gongshi," (Beijing Consensus), *Caijing Wenzhai* no. 8 (2004), [www.wiseman.co.cn/magazine/cjwz/0408/04101.htm](http://www.wiseman.co.cn/magazine/cjwz/0408/04101.htm).

<sup>81</sup> FPC, "China and Globalisation" 2005.

PRC leaders. The PRC newswire Xinhua reprinted a business journal article that argued the BC will replace the WC.<sup>82</sup> The leading newspaper carried an article in which economists Wu Shuqing (former head of Beijing University and now a Ministry of Education advisor) and Cheng Enfu (Academy of Marxism head and a proponent of the “socialist market economy” as a world model) endorsed the “theoretical scientificity and practical superiority “of the BC. Opposing it to the WC, they spoke of its “growing influence in the world, particularly among developing countries.”<sup>83</sup> Along with translations of Western books critical of the WC,<sup>84</sup> other Chinese works counter-pose the BC and WC,<sup>85</sup> a contrast now also taken up by some US scholars and commentators.<sup>86</sup>

In China, enthusiasm for the BC is found among those who seek to make their country the world’s leading state, while in some circles in the West it may stem from the view that the BC is a more saleable variant of the neo-liberal PWC or that any “consensus” is better than one enforced by the US.<sup>87</sup> In the Global South, however, there is a

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<sup>82</sup> Xinhua reprint cited in He Qinglian, “Zhuanzhi zhengzhi yinggai qudai minzhu zhengzhi?: ‘Beijing gongshi’ qudai ‘Huashengdun gongshi’ zhi guandian pingxi” (Should autocratic politics replace democratic politics? Commentary on the view of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ replacing the ‘Washington Consensus’), *Kan Zhongguo*, 15 Mar. 2005, [www.kanzhongguo.com/news/articles/5/3/15/89074.html](http://www.kanzhongguo.com/news/articles/5/3/15/89074.html).

<sup>83</sup> Wu Shiqing and Cheng Enfu, “The ‘Washington Consensus’ and ‘Beijing Consensus,’” *PD*, [http://english.people.com.cn/200506/18/print20050618\\_190947.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200506/18/print20050618_190947.html).

<sup>84</sup> David Held, *Quanqiu Menyue: Huashengdun gongshi yu shehui minzhu* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenjian chubanshe 2005) (*Global Covenant: the Social Democratic Alternative to the Washington Consensus*).

<sup>85</sup> Zhang Xiaojing, “Tansuo jinrong quanqiu shidai de fazhan daolu: qianxicong ‘Huasheng gongshi’ dao ‘Beijing gongshi’ (Exploring the financial global era development paths: a preliminary analysis of moving from the ‘Washington Consensus’ to the ‘Beijing consensus’), *Xueshi Shibao*, 16 Aug. 2004; Huang Ping & Cui Zhiyuan, *Zhongguo yu quanqiu hua: Huasheng gongshi haishi Beijing gongshi* (China and globalization: Washington Consensus or Beijing Consensus) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005); Wang Haiming (ed.) *Beijing gongshi* (Beijing consensus) (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 2005); Sidigelici yu zhuangui jingjixue: cong “Huashengdun gongshi” dao “Hou Huashengdun gongshi” zai dao “Beijing gongshi” (Stiglitz and transition economics: from the “Washington Consensus” to the “Post-Washington Consensus” to the “Beijing Consensus”)(Beijing: Zhongguo jingji chubanshe 2005).

<sup>86</sup> Joseph Nye, “The Rise of China’s Soft Power,” *WSJ Asia*, 29 Dec. 2005; Drew Thompson, “China’s Soft Power in Africa: from the ‘Beijing Consensus to Health Diplomacy,’” *CB* 5:21 (13 Oct. 2005):2.

<sup>87</sup> James Mittelman, “Globalization and Development: Learning from Debates in China,” forthcoming in *Globalizations*, [www.csglobalization.org/2.pdf](http://www.csglobalization.org/2.pdf), has questioned whether there is a Chinese consensus on development. For a leading PRC scholar’s critique of the prevailing model, see Wang Hui, *China’s New Order: Society, Politics, and Economy in Transition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

widespread sense of grievance with neo-liberalism, as an aggravated form of worldwide unequal exchange. At the CACF opening ceremony, Zambia's president stated

[Developed countries] are not prepared to discuss the issues of justice and fair play concerning the international trade and commercial sector, which imposes considerable suffering and privation on developing countries . . . [T]he developing world continues to subsidize consumption of the developed world, through an iniquitous trade system. The existing structure is designed to consign us to perpetual poverty and underdevelopment . . . It is unrealistic to expect support, relief or respite from those who benefit from the status quo.<sup>88</sup>

### The Beijing Consensus as a Competing Framework

Arif Dirlik has argued that the BC's key aspect may be its acknowledgement of the desirability of a global order "founded, not upon homogenizing universalisms that inevitably lead to hegemonism, but on a simultaneous recognition of commonality and difference."<sup>89</sup> That recognition magnifies China's soft power in Africa. With 53 countries, Africa has the largest concentration of developing states and is the BC's main testing ground. It stands in direct competition with several WC/PWC instruments initiated by the EU, US and S. Africa at the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, although PRC institutions of cooperation mirror the form and much of the content of those of developed states.<sup>90</sup>

The Cotonou Agreement of 2000, the EU framework for dealing with 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states, is based on principles of free trade, including WTO compliance and a sub-continental regionalism; privileged private enterprise, export production and FDI; austerity measures; conditionality for receipt of aid, with a leading

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<sup>88</sup> "Statement by the President of the Republic of Zambia Dr. Frederick J.T. Chiluba Delivered at the Opening Ceremony of the China-Africa Forum Held in Beijing, China," 27 Dec. 2000, [www.statehouse.gov.zm/press/news/viewnews.cgi?category=3&id=977917598](http://www.statehouse.gov.zm/press/news/viewnews.cgi?category=3&id=977917598)

<sup>89</sup> Arif Dirlik, "Beijing Consensus: Beijing 'Gongshi': Who Recognizes Whom and to What End," [http://anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/servlet/Position2pdf?fn=PP\\_Dirlik\\_BeijingConsensus](http://anscombe.mcmaster.ca/global1/servlet/Position2pdf?fn=PP_Dirlik_BeijingConsensus).

<sup>90</sup> Japan pioneered such institutions in the 1990s, e.g. the Tokyo International Conference on African Development. "Into Africa," *Japan Journal* 2:8 (Dec. 2005):6-11. Other PRC soft power elements in Africa include several branches of the Confucius Institute and Africa-based broadcasts of China Radio International, said to reach 100 million people. "1<sup>st</sup> Confucius Institute for Africa Launched in Nairobi," Xinhua, 20 Dec. 2005; "CRI Launches First Overseas FM Radio Station," CD, 3 Mar. 2006.

role provided to the EU's European Commission; and a precedence of individual political rights over group and socio-economic rights. Poverty reduction is seen as a concomitant of trade, capital liberalization, and FDI secured by the provision skilled and compliant labor. Quintennial conferences serve to renegotiate the EU-ACP relationship, which also includes bilateral and regional free trade Economic Partnership Agreements. These pacts, like those the US negotiates, weaken solidarity among developing states in the WTO.<sup>91</sup>

The US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 provides that states that marketize, liberalize, privatize, de-subsidize, deregulate and do not undermine US foreign policy interests may receive trade preferences. Some 37 African countries, many of them authoritarian, have been declared eligible. Once every two years, US and eligible states' ministers participate in an AGOA Forum. AGOA trade concessions only go slightly beyond the pre-existing US General System of Preferences, in part because oil accounts for four-fifths the value of African exports to the US. Only a few countries have gained under AGOA, mainly through exports of agricultural products not plentiful in the US, such as cut flowers. Most African products remain barred by competition from subsidized US agriculture and non-tariff health and safety barriers, while many products entering the US from Africa are produced by Asian-owned firms. Meanwhile, AGOA serves as a platform for FTAs between the US and African regional entities.<sup>92</sup> Its appeal

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<sup>91</sup> Alex Nunn and Sophia Price, "Managing Development: EU and African Relations through the Evolution of the Lome and Cotonou Agreements," *Historical Materialism* 12:4 (2004):203-230; Stephen Hurt, "Cooperation and Coercions? The Cotonou Agreement Between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lome Convention," *TWQ* 24:1 (2003):161-176; E.K. Bensah, "The Cotonou Agreement: Who is Agreeing?" *Review of International Social Questions*, 22 May 2003, [www.risq.or/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=92](http://www.risq.or/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=92).

<sup>92</sup> UNCTAD, *The African Growth and Opportunity Act: a Preliminary Assessment* (New York, 2003):1-2; Andrew Rice, "Letter from Uganda," *The Nation* (New York), 30 Aug. 2004:28-30; Henning Melber, "Globalisation Blocks Regional Integration," *Development and Cooperation* 32:2 (2005), [www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2005/tribune\\_art1.html](http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/03-2005/tribune_art1.html); Sanjaya Lall, "FDI, AGOA and Manufactured Exports by a Landlocked, Least Developed African Economy: Lesotho," *JDS* 41:6 (2005):998-1022.

for African rulers lies not mainly in direct benefits, but in closer political attachment to the US, resulting in aid, including military training useful in acting against oppositions.<sup>93</sup>

Since 2001, neo-liberal principles also have been embodied in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Based on the idea that there is no alternative to neo-liberalism and that only integration into the world market resolves poverty, this development-through-good-governance-and-poverty-reduction initiative is fostered by global and S. African firms and endorsed by the African Union. Critics compare NEPAD as implemented to IMF/World Bank SAP's,<sup>94</sup> but its representation as "by Africans for Africans" provides another mechanism for implementing developed countries' WC/PWC frameworks. US corporations in Africa thus link AGOA and NEPAD<sup>95</sup> and US leaders praise NEPAD as "extend[ing] democracy and free markets and transparency across the continent."<sup>96</sup> EU endorsements of NEPAD link it to the Cotonou Agreement.<sup>97</sup> China too voices support for NEPAD and holds it is helping to implement it through the CACF.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Conn Hallinan, "Desert Faux: The Sahara's Mirage of Terrorism," *Foreign Policy in Focus* (2 Mar. 2006), [www.fpif.org/fpif.txt/3136](http://www.fpif.org/fpif.txt/3136); Ann Tyson, US Pushes Anti-Terrorism in Africa, *Washington Post* (WP), 26 July 2005:A01. China has military missions in or sells weapons to seven African states. Pan 2006. US military aid and arms go to 47 African states. Association of Concerned African Scholars, "US Military Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2001-2003," <http://acas.prairienet.org/military.html>.

<sup>94</sup> Ishmael Lesufi, "South Africa and the Rest of the Continent: Toward a Critique of the Political Economy of NEPAD," *Current Sociology*, 52:5 (2004):809-829; Jimi O. Adesina, "Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD, Post-Washington Consensus and Beyond," forthcoming in J.O. Adesina, et al. (eds.) *Africa and Development Challenges in the New Millennium: the NEPAD Debate* (London: Zed, 2006); J.O. Adesina, NEPAD and the challenge of Africa's Development: toward the Political Economy of a Discourse," *Society in Transition*. 35:1 (2004):125-144; Patrick Bond (ed.), *Fanon's Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa's Development* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2005).

<sup>95</sup> "Statement of Stephen Hayes, President, Corporate Council on Africa," in *The New Partnership for Africa's Development: an African Initiative*, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Africa, US House of Representatives Serial no. 107-114, 18 Sept. 2002:18-20.

<sup>96</sup> White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Bush Discusses US-Africa Partnership from South Africa," 9 July 2003, [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030709-35.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030709-35.html).

<sup>97</sup> Michael Lake, "Nepad, the AU and the EU: the Challenges of a Relationship," Workshop on "Putting the Partnership into Nepad," Pretoria, 22 May 2003; [www.eusa.org.za](http://www.eusa.org.za).

<sup>98</sup> Liu Guijin, 2004.

The BC appears as an alternative to obviously neo-liberal “consensuses” because PRC aid comes without the strings attached by AGOA and other programs and because China approves African states concentrating investment in infrastructure and human capital, rather than primary products, and addressing development problems not being solved through market fundamentalism’s favored corporate initiatives. Jim McDermott, the US Congressman known as the “Father of AGOA,” has implicitly drawn this contrast:

[T]he US cannot rely solely on the private sector to help support Africa’s endeavor to develop. Private companies may invest in new manufacturing plants or mineral extracting facilities, but they usually do not drill water in remote villages, or build schools to educate young Africans. Do you know of many venture capitalists who buy malaria or TB drugs for the world’s poor to enhance their trade opportunities?<sup>99</sup>

To some analysts, the differences between the WC/PWC and BC now amount to a US-China “ideological” struggle between a “neo-liberal Anglo-Saxon credo” and an Asian-derived “socially oriented” approach.<sup>100</sup> A prominent British journalist has even put it that the BC/WC confrontation around the world represents “the biggest ideological threat the west has felt since the end of the cold war.” Expressing no doubt about which “model” will prevail, he opines that two decades from now “the press will be full of articles about ‘Asian values’ and the ‘Beijing Consensus.’”<sup>101</sup>

### Distinctive Aid and Migration

PRC aid to Africa and the patterns of migration of Chinese to Africa and Africans to China differ from Western practices, but relate to each other. Infrastructure development as the centerpiece of PRC aid facilitates China-Africa migration. Over several decades, China has sent 15,000-20,000 medical personnel to Africa to develop hospitals and

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<sup>99</sup> Antonio de Figueiredo, “Africa’s Relations with the West,” *New African*, no. 416 (Mar. 2003):24-25.

<sup>100</sup> Eric Teo Chu Cheow, “U.S.-China Ideological Rivalry Heats Up,” *Japan Times*, 5 Jan. 2006.

<sup>101</sup> Mark Leonard, “The Road Obscured,” FT, 9 July 2005: 16; M. Leonard, “The Geopolitics of 2026,” *Economist*, 16 Nov. 2005, [www.cer.org.uk/articles/leonard\\_economist\\_16nov05.html](http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/leonard_economist_16nov05.html).

clinics and treat 180 million patients.<sup>102</sup> Chinese have long aided African agricultural development.<sup>103</sup> More than 10,000 PRC agro-technicians have been sent to Africa since the 1960s and worked on some 200 projects, including setting up farms and agricultural stations and personnel training.<sup>104</sup> In Tanzania, the PRC-built Ubungo Farm Implements Factory (UFI) turned out 85% of hand tools in a country that relies on hoes, plows and machetes for farming, while the Mbarali Farm produced a fourth of the rice eaten by Tanzanians.<sup>105</sup> Some 530 PRC teachers have worked in African secondary and tertiary education and Chinese have also gone to Africa to train government staff.<sup>106</sup> Many more go for contract labor service, building railways, roads, telecommunications systems, hospitals, schools and dams or to do business that uses much of that infrastructure.

Africans go to China to learn how to build the infrastructure themselves or how to work in it as doctors, teachers, officials, etc. From 1956-1999, 5,582 Africans studied at Chinese universities. In 2002, there were 1,646 African students (of 85,000 foreign students) in China; 525 undergraduates, 539 masters and 223 doctoral students, plus 278 in non-degree courses, while new students in 2004 numbered 332. China provides 1,500 scholarships annually to Africans and by late 2004, 17,860 Africans had received one, with about 15,000 having graduated. Graduates include a number of political leaders.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> “Expert: China-Africa Cooperation with Bright Future,” China Radio International, 16 December 2003, <http://en.chinabroadcast.cn/144/2003-12-16/88@70013.htm>; Thompson, 2005. While some countries pay the medical teams’ expenses, it is often done with grants or loans from China or other states.

<sup>103</sup> Deborah Brautigam, *Chinese Aid and African Development: Exporting Green Revolution* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).

<sup>104</sup> “Focus is on Aid and Support for Africa,” BD, in AN, 1 Oct. 2004:23.

<sup>105</sup> Ai Ping, “From Proletarian Internationalism to Mutual Development: China’s Cooperation with Tanzania, 1965-95,” in Goran Hyden and R. Muknadala (eds.), *Agencies in Foreign Aid: Comparing China, Sweden and the United States in Tanzania* (Houndsmill: Macmillan 1999):156-201.

<sup>106</sup> “China has Education Cooperation Ties with 50 African Nations,” Xinhua 27 Nov. 2005; Lu 2006; Ryu, 2004; Kunda, 2005.

<sup>107</sup> “Fruitful Sino-African Cooperation in Education and Culture,” PD, 2 Oct. 2000, [http://english.people.com.cn/english/200010/02/eng20001002\\_51732.html](http://english.people.com.cn/english/200010/02/eng20001002_51732.html). *Zhongguo Feizhou Jiaoyu Jiaoliu yu Hezuo* (China-Africa Educational Exchange & Cooperation) (Beijing: Ministry of Education 2003):17; Frank Ching,



A few Africans remain in the PRC after graduation, some engaging in China-Africa business links, despite the many difficulties presented by a commonplace racism.<sup>108</sup>

China's aid to Africa, while not disinterested, is not used as a political tool in the same way as aid from Western political actors in Africa. This approach is a longstanding policy. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania's first leader, commenting on the loan for building Tazara stated: "The Chinese people have not asked us to become communists in order to qualify for this loan . . . they have never at any point suggested that we should change any of our policies – internal or external."<sup>109</sup> During the Cold War, the US and other Western states pressured Tanzania to take the West's side and later to accept IMF/World Bank SPA's. The US is now heavily involved in influencing African politics, for example through multi-million dollar programs to support or undermine the governments of Angola, Burundi, Sudan and Zimbabwe, carried out by the self-described "overtly political" Office of Transition Initiatives of the US Agency for International Development.<sup>110</sup>

Chinese aid has also differed from US aid in terms of whether it was to be the recipient or donor who decides the projects on which aid monies were to be spent. Although China's approach is more commercial than in the past and favors joint ventures between private firms, it contrasts with US and UK insistence on aiding only private enterprise

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"Cosy Ties, but China Needs to do more for Africa," *Business Times* (Sing.), 13 July 2005; Xinhua, 27 Nov. 2005. Interviews with Dr. Teshome Mulatu, Speaker, Ethiopian House of Federation (Beijing University PhD) and Jirma, General Manager of Administration Bureau of City Transport, Addis Ababa (Fudan University one year course), Addis Ababa, July 2004. "Talking Points for Director-General Xu Jinghu . . .," 2005, [www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt.eng/zxxx/t196995.htm](http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt.eng/zxxx/t196995.htm).

<sup>108</sup> Dismas Nyamwana, "Cross-Cultural Adaption: African Students in China," *Ife Psychologia* 12:2 (2004):1-16; Sandra Gillespie, *South-South Transfer: Study of Sino-African Exchanges* (New York: Garland 2001):98-108, 169-179; Interviews with Africans, Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, Jan. 2006.

<sup>109</sup> Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Development* (Dar Es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1974):235.

<sup>110</sup> "Angola: Transnational Issues," [http://open-site.org/Regional/Africa/Angola/Transnational\\_Issues/](http://open-site.org/Regional/Africa/Angola/Transnational_Issues/); USAID, et al., "Burundi Complex Emergency Situation Report #2," [www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6EFQGF?OpenDocument](http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6EFQGF?OpenDocument); "USAID/OTI Sudan Field Report", Sept. 2005, [www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transition\\_initiatives/country/sudan/rpt](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/sudan/rpt); Chris McGreal, "US Funds Penetrate Zimbabwe Airwaves," *Guardian*, 24 Jan. 2002:17; "Democracy's 'Special Forces' Face Heat," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 Feb. 2006:6.

development.<sup>111</sup> It continues to support some state-run projects, both in industry and agriculture. There is no evidence China conditions its aid on adoption of a particular political stance or alignment, except that recipients must maintain full diplomatic relations with the PRC, rather than Taiwan, as all but six African countries do.<sup>112</sup>

PRC migrants are more numerous and likely to become long-term residents than Westerners in Africa. Many fewer are managers and professionals. Migration of Africans to China is also of a different order: the numbers are much smaller than those of African migrants to Europe and North America, the migrants are still overwhelmingly temporary, and there is little of the “brain drain” that marks Africans’ flow to developed states.

### Tied and Untied Aid

A PRC official has said “There are no political conditions attached with China’s economic assistance,”<sup>113</sup> but much developed state aid is subject to conditions benefiting the donor economically and politically (including its security interests). A study notes

Tied aid is a particularly inefficient form of development assistance because it does not help poor countries develop their economies. Instead of creating new businesses and jobs in recipient countries, most of the benefits remain in the donor nations. Tied aid is also inefficient because often goods and services would be available at a lower price from local producers or world markets.<sup>114</sup>

About 80% of US grants and contracts to developing countries must be used to buy goods and services from US firms and NGOs. About 90% of Italy’s aid benefits Italian companies and experts; 60-65% of Canada’s aid and much of that of Germany, Japan and

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<sup>111</sup> For example, the UK’s Commission on Africa 2005 report states that Africa should adopt the Private Finance Initiative: all major projects should be ‘built and delivered in conjunction with the private sector.’ Quoted in Fraser Nelson, “How African Aid Can Be the New Imperialism,” *Scotsman*, 8 June 2005:26.

<sup>112</sup> Rwekaza Mukandala, “From Proud Defiance to Beggary: a Recipient’s Tale” in Hyden & Mukandala 1999:31-67; Phillip Liu, “Cross-Strait Scramble for Africa: a Hidden Agenda in China-Africa Cooperation Forum,” *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, Spring 2001, [www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200102/0102a\\_006.htm](http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200102/0102a_006.htm).

<sup>113</sup> Lu 2006.

<sup>114</sup> Pekka Hirvonen, *Stingy Samaritans: Why Recent Increases in Development Aid Fail to Help the Poor*, Global Policy Forum, 2005, <http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC20305.htm>.

France is tied to purchases from those states. A UN study found such ties cut by 25-40% the value of aid to Africans, who are required to buy non-competitively priced imports.<sup>115</sup> An OECD study found that the actual costs of tied direct food aid transfers are 50% higher than local food purchases and a third higher than buying third country food.<sup>116</sup>

The popular view in the West is nevertheless that developed countries are generous with Africa, in response to NGOs seeking to help Africa through debt relief and increased aid.<sup>117</sup> Yet, from 1970 to 2002, Africa received \$530b in aid and loans and repaid \$540b. G8 and international institutions subsequently cancelled the debt of only 14 African states and the continent's debt still stands at about US\$300b. An additional \$50b in aid was promised in 2005, but more than half of that is either double-counted or involves money already pledged. Debt relief for Africa and refugee-related expenditures in developed countries are also counted by them as part of increased development assistance.<sup>118</sup>

China's aid to Africa provides it with political benefits, such as support from aided countries for China on sovereignty issues and for China gaining "market economy status" that will enable it to better resist anti-dumping actions brought before the WTO.<sup>119</sup> If China were to confront Western states in international forums -- it does so now only to overcome US attempts to have its human rights record condemned -- support could be expected from the few African states where it is beginning to exercise hegemony and

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<sup>115</sup> "Tied Aid . . ." 2004; Lara Pawson, "You Let Her into the House? Reflections on the Politics of Aid in Africa," *Radical Philosophy* (May/June 2005), [www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel\\_id=2187&editorial\\_id+17648](http://www.radicalphilosophy.com/default.asp?channel_id=2187&editorial_id+17648).

<sup>116</sup> OECD, *The Development Effectiveness of Food Aid* (Paris: OECD 2005).

<sup>117</sup> China has cancelled debt totaling \$1.3b from 31 African countries. "Fifty Years Later, a Powerful China Basks in the Bandung Spirit," IPS, 20 Apr. 2005.

<sup>118</sup> Noreena Hertz, "We Achieved Next to Nothing," *NS*, 12 Dec. 2005:14-16; Hirvonen 2006:12; Patrick Abila, "It is Trade, Not Aid that will Lift Continent from Poverty," *East African*, in AN, 8 Nov. 2005.

<sup>119</sup> Ching 2005.

several others it aids. China, unlike the US and UK, does not however need to demand support from other states for war-making and the control of international institutions.

PRC firms do secure contracts on projects in Africa financed by Chinese government soft loans; an analyst speaks of “indirect conditionalities,” an understanding Chinese firms will secure a portion of work financed by PRC loans.<sup>120</sup> The \$2b credit line China extended to Angola in 2004, used for railroad repair, road building, office construction, a fiber-optic network and oil exploration, was guaranteed by a contract for the sale of oil from a field that generates 10,000 bpd. The loan, at 1.5% interest, will be recouped over 17 years, including a 5-year interest free period. Its terms reserve for Angolans 30% of the value of contracts paid for with its funds, but Angolans fear PRC firms will win the remaining 70%, engendering resentment among them.<sup>121</sup> Chinese firms, however, can in any case be expected to secure many construction contracts: in Botswana, they now win 80%.<sup>122</sup> Their winning bids are based on low labor costs and profit margins and a quick project turn-around. In Ethiopia, some PRC firms have been instructed by their government to make unprofitable bids to get a foot in the door for future undertakings. Lower salaries and profits margins also arise from state-owned PRC firms competing with each other to secure contracts.<sup>123</sup> In any case, efficient, low-cost Chinese practices in construction soften the image of PRC participation in the overall unequal relationship in trade and investment between Africa and the more developed states, including China.

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<sup>120</sup> John Kuada, “Learning from Asia: Chinese Investment Inflows to Africa and their Possible Impact on African Management Practices,” *African Renaissance* (July-Aug. 2005):36-41.

<sup>121</sup> “Angola: Oil Backed Loan Will Finance Recovery Projects,” IRIN, 21 Feb. 2005, [www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45688](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45688); IRIN, “Angola: Cautious Optimism for 2005,” 14 Jan. 2005, [www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45077](http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45077); “Angola/China: an Example of South-South Cooperation,” APA, in AN, 25 Mar. 2004; Donnelly 2005.

<sup>122</sup> “Chinese Influence in Africa Raises Fears,” UPI, 29 July 2005.

<sup>123</sup> Shinn 2005; Lyman 2005; interview with PRC engineer working on Ethiopia’s Takedze dam, July 2004.

While China's aid to Africa is thus not entirely untied, it is distinct from Western aid in a key way that stands at the intersection of aid and migration. As one analyst explains:

Chinese aid is often dispensed in such a way that corrupt rulers cannot somehow use it to buy Mercedes Benzes . . . [It] is often in the form of infrastructure, such as a railroad network in Nigeria or roads in Kenya and Rwanda. Or in the form of doctors and nurses to provide health care to people who otherwise would not have access . . . . In addition, China provides scholarships for African students to study in its universities and, increasingly, funds to encourage its businessmen to invest in Africa.<sup>124</sup>

Speaking of China's activities in Africa, including aid, Sierra Leone's Ambassador to the PRC has said "The Chinese are investing in Africa and are seeing results, while the G-8 countries are putting in huge sums of money and they don't see very much."<sup>125</sup> This difference advantages China in African eyes even when altruistic motives are discounted.

#### Draining and Gaining Migrations

Differing migration patterns are another key distinction between China-Africa links and Western connections with the continent. Africans generally perceive Chinese who work in Africa as less privileged and exploitative than Western expatriates.<sup>126</sup> Chinese construction personnel and agricultural advisors live more like their African counterparts than do expats, in keeping with the Eighth Principle on External Economic and Technical Assistance set out by Premier Zhou Enlai during a 1964 trip to Africa: "The experts dispatched by the Chinese government to help construction in the recipient country should enjoy the same living conditions as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands and ask for any special

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<sup>124</sup> Ching 2005.

<sup>125</sup> "Africa Big Oil Supplier to China," UPI, 18 July 2005.

<sup>126</sup> Western analysts, in contrast, often subtly shift the focus away from the West's business and political practices in Africa by focusing on the Chinese presence. See Binyavanga Wainaina's bitterly satirical "advise" to Western writers in "How to Write About Africa," *Granta* no. 92 (2006) ("When talking about exploitation by foreigners, mention the Chinese and Indian traders"), [www.granta.com/extracts/2615](http://www.granta.com/extracts/2615).

amenities.”<sup>127</sup> Similarly, the small, usually short-term African migrations to China are seen as benefiting Africa, while many Africans view the large, permanent migration of African professionals to the West as more harmful than helpful to Africa’s development.

A surge in Chinese migration to Africa began in the mid-1990s and accelerated in the present decade, quickly rendering population estimates obsolete. An Ohio University (OU) database, last updated in 2002, shows 137,000 Chinese in Africa, the same figure provided for 2000-2001 by Taiwan’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC).<sup>128</sup> Its estimates for 34 African states are now very out-of-date, due to the migration surge. While some discrepancies may reflect differing conceptions of residence, the magnitude of the differences indicates the rapid growth Africa’s Chinese communities.

Table 1: Number of Chinese in Select African Countries, ca. 2001 and Later Dates

| Country       | Ohio U. Database 2001 | Estimate for 200X       |
|---------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|
| Cameroon      | 50                    | 1000-3000 (2005)        |
| Sudan         | 45                    | 5000-10,000 (2004-2005) |
| Lesotho       | 1000                  | 5000 (2005)             |
| Ghana         | 500                   | 6000 (2004)             |
| Liberia       | 120                   | 600* (2006)             |
| Nigeria       | 2000                  | 50,000 (2005)           |
| Mozambique    | 700                   | 1500 (2006)             |
| Ethiopia      | 100                   | 2000 (2004)             |
| Algeria       | 2,000                 | 8000 (2003)             |
| Cote d’Ivoire | 200                   | 1000 (2002)             |
| Zimbabwe      | 300                   | 10,000 (2005)           |

\* Not including Chinese UN peacekeepers. Sources: “Two Arrested in Cameroon Over Murder of Chinese Shopkeeper,” AFP, 23 Feb. 2005; Denis Tull, *Die Afrikapolitik der Volksrepublik China* (Berlin: Deutsche Institut für Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, 2005):23, fn. 98; “China and Sudan Reap Benefits from Marriage of Convenience,” *Sudan Tribune*, 22 Mar. 2005; Jasper Becker, “China Fights UN Sanctions on Sudan to Safeguard Oil,” *Independent* (London), 15 Oct. 2004; Interviews with Chinese in Addis Ababa, July 2004, Accra, Ghana, July 2005; emails, PRC Mozambique and Liberia embassies 14, 21 Feb. 2006; “Rescue for Algerian Quake Survivors Continues,” 26 May 2003, [www.humanrights.cn/news /2003-5-](http://www.humanrights.cn/news /2003-5-)

<sup>127</sup> Donnelly, 2005. The Eight Principles were followed in 1983 by four principles announced by Premier Zhao Ziyang, including that “The experts and technical personnel sent by the Chinese side do not ask for any special treatment.” Ai Ping 1999:169.

<sup>128</sup> “Distribution of the Overseas Chinese Population,” [www.library.ohiou.edu/subjects/shao/databases\\_popdis.htm](http://www.library.ohiou.edu/subjects/shao/databases_popdis.htm); Zhonghua Minguo (Taiwan) Qiaowu Weiyuanhui, “Haiwai Huaren renkou shu (Overseas Ethnic Chinese Population Figures) (2005), [www.ocac.gov.tw/index.asp](http://www.ocac.gov.tw/index.asp). The 2004 figure is 154,000.

[26/China2003526100129.htm](http://26/China2003526100129.htm); “Chinese Citizens Evacuated to Safety from Bouake,” PD, 28 Sept. 2002; “Beijing Greets Mugabe with New Aid Deal,” *Daily Telegraph* (DT) (London), 27 July 2005:11.

The largest discrepancy concerns S. Africa. The OU database shows 30,000 Chinese in 2002, but there were already 36,000 in 1993, on the eve of the transition from apartheid. The 10,000 “indigenous” or “South African Born Chinese” (SABCs) were almost the whole Chinese population until 1980. Between then and 1993, an immigrant community, 90% from Taiwan, began to form. A decade later, the PRC Embassy in S. Africa stated there were 50,000-100,000 or perhaps 80,000 Chinese residents, while the S. African Ambassador to China has said there are many more than 100,000. Almost all the increase of the last dozen years has come from Chinese mainland migrants, as the Taiwan-origin community shrank by half to 10,000 and the SABC population also declined. Estimates in 2004-2006 ranged from 100,000-300,000 (legal and illegal) Chinese residents.<sup>129</sup>

A Belgian diplomat in Tanzania once told a Japanese diplomat in the early 1970s that one of his African employees had queried, “Why are there two kinds of Chinese in Tanzania? One kind wears dirty clothes, looks poor, but works very hard; another kind wears a good suit, rides in a modern car with a camera on his shoulder, and looks like an American.” The African worker was conflating as “Chinese” those who had come from

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<sup>129</sup> Dudley Poston, et al., “The Global Distribution of the Oversea Chinese Around 1990,” *Population & Development Review* 20:3 (1994):631-634; Elaine Chen, “Hopelessly De-Vote-ed,” [www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/show\\_issue.php?id=199628502076E.TXT&page=1](http://www.taiwan-panorama.com/en/show_issue.php?id=199628502076E.TXT&page=1); Liu Guijin, “Great Prospects for Sino-African Cooperation,” 11 Dec. 2003, [www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82197](http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82197); “S. African Diplomat say “No Organized Effort” Against Chinese in his Country,” Xinhua 13 Feb. 2006; Charles Thomas, “From Underclass to Community Leaders: the Chinese Experience in South Africa,” 23 Apr. 2004, <http://publish.gio.gov.tw/FCJ/current/04042371.html>; “Chinese People Need a Channel so they can have a Say,” *Johannesburg Star*, 10 May 2004:1; Janet Wilhelm, “The Chinese Communities in South Africa,” in Sakhela Buhlungu (et al.), *State of the Nation 2005-2006* (Capetown: HSRC Press 2005); Interviews with South African Chinese, Johannesburg and Capetown, June-July 2004; “South Africa Fetes Chinese New Year with Dragons and Bollywood,” AFP, 30 Jan. 2006; “Chinese Envoy to S. Africa Defends Country’s Policy Toward Africa,” *Sunday Times*, 14 Mar. 2006.

the PRC to build Tazara and Japanese visiting Tanzania for very different purposes.<sup>130</sup>

While only a small part of Chinese in Africa today perform service of the kind rendered then by their compatriots, substantial differences remain between the positions of Chinese and citizens of developed countries in Africa. A South African university official has advanced a common, implicitly comparative viewpoint in noting that China provides low-cost technology and its people are willing to work in inhospitable places.<sup>131</sup>

Most developed country citizens in Africa are managers or professionals. Some work for large corporations, others are among the 40,000 NGO-employed expats.<sup>132</sup> They generally command salaries that allow a lifestyle very different from most Africans and usually better than local occupational peers. Larger Chinese communities in Africa also have well-off members, usually business people. Most long-term Chinese residents in Africa, however, are small merchants who sell what one Kenyan has called “down-street merchandise.” Many have very little capital.<sup>133</sup> In Zimbabwe, Zambia and S. Africa, there are also Chinese farmers.<sup>134</sup> An unknown number of Chinese study in Africa. Most are in S. Africa where, by 2004, 3,300 Chinese had attended tertiary institutions.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> “The Japanese – Still Unknown,” Address, Suma Michiaki, Amb. of Japan to Canada, 26 Apr. 1979 to the Empire Club, [www.empireclubfoundation.com/details/asp?SpeechID=1701&FT=yes](http://www.empireclubfoundation.com/details/asp?SpeechID=1701&FT=yes). On Tanzania’s “Friendship Mill” see “Peking Builds Largest Tanzania Textile Mill,” *Black Panther* (US), 15 Jan. 1969:3, [www.etext.org/Politics/bpp/bpp19690115\\_3\\_tanzania.html](http://www.etext.org/Politics/bpp/bpp19690115_3_tanzania.html). In the mid-90s, it still had 4,000 workers and received technical assistance from China. In 1997, it became a joint venture of Dieqiu Textiles of China (51%) and Tanzania’s government (49%) and in 2000 was declared an Export Processing Zone. M.S.D. Bagachwa & Amy Mbelle, “Tanzania,” in Samuel Wangwe (ed.), *Exporting Africa: Technology, Trade and Industrialization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (London: Routledge 1995); “Tanzania, China Launch Joint Textile Firm, Xinhua, 1 Apr. 1997; “Tanzania to Establish Export Processing Zones,” Xinhua, 15 Oct. 2000.

<sup>131</sup> Domingos Jardos Muekalia, “Africa and China’s Strategic Partnership,” *African Security Review* 13:1 (2004):5-11.

<sup>132</sup> Thompson Ayodele, *Aid, Trade, Subsidies and Development in Africa*, Institute of Public Policy Analysis (s.d., 2003?), [http://ippanigeria.org/page.php?instructions=page&page\\_id=323&nav\\_id=87](http://ippanigeria.org/page.php?instructions=page&page_id=323&nav_id=87).

<sup>133</sup> “Enter the Dragon,” *The Nation* (Kenya), in AN, 1 Nov. 2005; See also “Chinese Doughnuts Producers Perturb Bamileke Traders,” *The Post* (Cameroon), in AN, 25 July 2005 (donuts); Abu Mayanja, “Uganda Should Invite ‘Real’ Chinese Investors,” *New Vision* (Uganda), in AN, 10 May 2005 (pancakes).

<sup>134</sup> “China-Africa Ties Grow and Tip Global Balance,” 3 Jan. 2006, [www.asianews.it/view\\_p.php?l=en&art=5023](http://www.asianews.it/view_p.php?l=en&art=5023); Archbishop Pius Ncube, et al., “Zimbabwe’s Chinese Puzzle,” *Embassy* (Canada), 3 Aug. 2005, [www.embassymag.ca/html/index/php?display=story&full\\_path=2005/august/3/zimbabwe/](http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index/php?display=story&full_path=2005/august/3/zimbabwe/); Alisha



Many temporary Chinese migrants work in Africa under labor service contracts.<sup>136</sup> They are paid much less and live more frugally than Western expats doing comparable work. In 1992, Africa employed 100,000 developed country expats at a cost of \$4b per year, i.e. \$40,000 per expat or nearly \$800 per week.<sup>137</sup> These generally work, directly or indirectly, for African governments or NGOs; Westerners employed by multi-national corporations have even higher salaries. Chinese salaries are even now not nearly so high. Chinese “workers” (i.e. managers, engineers and skilled craftsmen) for one construction firm in Angola receive some \$500 a month, live two to three to a room, and cook for themselves, while Europeans each rent a house and eat out.<sup>138</sup> China’s largest contract in Africa, worth \$650m, is to construct Sudan’s Merowe Dam, where in 2003-2005, 1,800 Chinese and 1,600 Sudanese have worked. A Chinese firm won the bid because it kept expected profit margins and PRC staff costs low. All project managers, 90% of engineers and 75% of technicians are to be Chinese; locals are to be 20% of skilled workers and all general labor. Expatriates are to earn \$220-\$600 per week, Sudanese \$22-\$350.<sup>139</sup>

While many Chinese now live in Africa, few Africans live in China. Beijing in 2005 had about 600 Africans, Shanghai 500, and Shenzhen 100.<sup>140</sup> The vast majority were students expected to return to Africa within 4-5 years. Most study medicine, engineering

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Ryu, “China’s Expanding Political, Economic Reach Deep into East Africa, VOA, 29 Sept. 2004, [www1.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=D6721C6C-1CD0-42C%-B4AEF9884859806](http://www1.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=D6721C6C-1CD0-42C%-B4AEF9884859806).

<sup>135</sup> “People to People Contacts Enhanced” BD, 1 Oct. 2004:20.

<sup>136</sup> By 2005, the accumulated value of PRC firms’ construction contracts in Africa had reached \$34b, with 74,000 Chinese workers involved. PRC workers in Africa are however a small part of the 3.2m Chinese sent abroad to work. “China-Africa Trade Surges to New High in 1005,” Xinhua 5 Jan. 2006; “Talking Points for Deputy Direct-General Qi Jianwei . . .,” 24 May 2005, [www.focac.org/eng/hxxd/jzgz/t196993](http://www.focac.org/eng/hxxd/jzgz/t196993); “China Facts & Figures 2005,” [www.china.org.cn/english/en-sz2005/jj/jj-dw.htm](http://www.china.org.cn/english/en-sz2005/jj/jj-dw.htm).

<sup>137</sup> Konia Kolllehlon and Edward Eule, “The Socioeconomic Attainment Patterns of Africans in the United States,” *International Migration Review* 37:4 (2003):1165-1190.

<sup>138</sup> Donnelly 2005.

<sup>139</sup> Peter Reina, “Chinese Contractors Flex Lean Muscles in Sudan,” *Engineering News-Record*, 12 Apr. 2004:18; “Dam up the Nile to Benefit Poverty-Stricken Sudanese,” Xinhua, 29 Jan. 2006; PRC contractors building Ethiopia’s roads seek a 3% profit; Western businesses typically seek 15% or more. Leggett 2005.

<sup>140</sup> Interviews with Africans in these cities, Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006.

or natural science, a small brain gain that contrasts with Africa's brain drain to the West that originated with the SAPs. These have required sharp reductions in state involvement in economies. Up to 1980, Africa had a dozen high growth countries, averaging 6%. A third of African states had savings rates higher than 25%, which sustained human resource development. SAPs curtailed social expenditures, including at universities, and costly expats had to be imported to take the place of local intellectuals. Savings rates plummeted to 10% today, too low for industrialization or adequate education.<sup>141</sup> Thus, Africa produces only 83 engineers per one million people annually, while China graduates 750 and developed countries 1,000.<sup>142</sup> Many African engineers emigrate moreover; there are more African engineers working in the US than in all of Africa.<sup>143</sup>

The effect of SAPs on education created a "push" factor that contributed to an exodus of Africa's intelligentsia. From 1985-1990, 60,000 professionals emigrated. By 2005, 300,000-500,000, including 30,000 doctoral degree holders, had left and 20,000 more emigrate each year to the US or Europe. The half million figure would mean a third of African professionals had left; on average each represents a loss of \$184,000 to Africa.<sup>144</sup>

Of 400,000 African immigrants age 16 and over in the US in 2000, 36% were managers or professionals. Many were brought in through the Diversity Visa Program ("Green Card Lottery"), most of whose winners are Africans. By 2005, 50,000 Africans a year were migrating to the US, with perhaps four times that number entering illegally.

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<sup>141</sup> Mahmood Mamdani, "Misrule Britannia," *Guardian* (UK), 8 February 2002.

<sup>142</sup> Nelson Mandela Institution, "African Institute of Science & Technology," [www.nmiscience.org/aist.html](http://www.nmiscience.org/aist.html).

<sup>143</sup> African Capacity Building Foundation, *An Analysis of the Market for Skilled African Development Management Professionals* (s.l.: 2004):15, [www.acbf-pact.org/knowledge/operations.asp](http://www.acbf-pact.org/knowledge/operations.asp).

<sup>144</sup> Silvia Federici and George Caffentzis, "Globalization and Professionalization in Africa," *Social Text* 22:2 (2004):81-99; Ali Mazrui and Amadu Kaba, "Between the Brain Drain and the Brain Bonus: the African Diaspora as a Nation Afloat," Africa's Brain Gain Conference, Nairobi, 19-22 Dec. 2004, [www.africabraingain.org/conference/report/ali\\_mazrui.pdf](http://www.africabraingain.org/conference/report/ali_mazrui.pdf); Kwamchestsi Makokha, "Who'd Take a \$500 Job in Africa," *NS*, 14 Mar. 2005:29-30; Karen MacGregor, "Out of Africa," *Times Higher Education Supplement*, 1 July 2005:18.

While such migrants usually find work and send remittances home, a leading African scientist in the US estimates that Africans there contribute 40 times more to America than to Africa's economy.<sup>145</sup> Others stay on after graduation from US universities, which had 34,000 African students in 2000-2001, 6.25% of their international students.<sup>146</sup> Most were graduate students and a survey of Africans who received US PhDs from 1986-1996 showed that 37% remained there after graduation. The percentages of those staying were higher in fields important to development: engineering (54%), physical sciences (44%) health sciences (44%) and business management (67%). The percentages were higher too for two of the three top PhD-producing countries, Nigeria (62%) and Ghana (61%).<sup>147</sup>

The poaching of Africa's human resources is most apparent among medical workers, of which Africa has 1.4 per 1,000 people, while North America has 9.9.<sup>148</sup> Of Africa's estimated 800,000 "trained medical staff," 23,000 per year leave for developed countries. The doctors among them cost on average \$100,000 to train.<sup>149</sup> Their immigration saves a receiving country like Britain \$340,000-430,000 in the costs of training a doctor. Ghana, with six doctors for each 100,000 people, has lost 30% of the MDs it educated to the US, UK, Canada and Australia, all of which have more than 220 doctors per 100,000, while S. Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda have lost 14-19% of their doctors. In 2001, Zimbabwe

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<sup>145</sup> Mazrui & Kaba 2004; Nandi Herbert, "Africa: Killing us Softly," *New African* (Nov. 2005):9-12; Sam Roberts, "More Africans Entering US than in Days of Slavery," *NYT*, 21 Feb. 2005:1; Gilbert Manda, "Brain Drain or Brain Gain?" *New African* (Dec. 2004):74.

<sup>146</sup> "Jennifer Coffman & Kevin Brennan, "African Studies Abroad: Meaning and Impact of America's Burgeoning Export Industry," *Frontiers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad* 9 (2006):139-147.

<sup>147</sup> Mark Pires, etc., *Investing in Return: Rates of Return of African PhDs Trained in North America* (New York: Social Science Research Council 1999). The other country was the continent's richest, South Africa.

<sup>148</sup> Sebastian Mallaby, "How Africa Subsidizes U.S. Health Care," *WP*, 29 Nov. 2004:A19.

<sup>149</sup> Andrew Jack, "'Brain Drain' puts Africa's Hospitals on the Critical List," *FT*, 7 July 2005:20.

graduated 737 nurses, 437 of whom left for Britain.<sup>150</sup> There are more Ethiopian-trained doctors in Chicago than in Ethiopia; more Beninese doctors in France than in Benin.<sup>151</sup>

### Conclusion

In 2005, a PRC official working on WTO affairs, Wu Jiahuang, made a presentation to a UN agency on industrialization, trade and poverty alleviation through South-South cooperation.<sup>152</sup> Wu noted industry's increasing importance to China's GDP and argued its high growth rate was fueled by Chinese saving 44% of their income and by China's encouragement of FDI (half from Hong Kong and Taiwan), which contributed 28% of value added to industry in 2004. He said PRC industrial development and trade expansion are related, with over half of industrial exports produced by foreign investors.

Wu stated that China's trade with the South was growing rapidly and is not marginalized; for example, a zero tariff is in place for 25 of Africa's Least Developed Countries (LDCs). PRC trade policy, he said, rejects over-protecting domestic industry. Average PRC tariffs dropped from 43% in 1992 to 10% in 2005, lower than those of its trading partners.<sup>153</sup> China's tariffs for primary agricultural products and textiles averaged 15.5% and 12.9%, while those of its trading partners averaged 24.5% and 17.7%. China provides world-class resources and "the cheapest domestic labor," so foreign and domestic businessmen can market the world's most competitive products. One result is

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<sup>150</sup> JB Eastwood, et al., "Loss of Health Professionals from Sub-Saharan Africa: the Pivotal Role of the UK," *Lancet* 365 (28 May 2005):1893-1900; Fitzhugh Mullan, "The Metrics of Physician Brain Drain," *New England Journal of Medicine* 353:17 (27 Oct. 2005): 1810-1818; Mallaby 2004.

<sup>151</sup> "Aids Ravaged Africa Hit by Mass Exodus," *DT*, 2 Nov. 2004:04; International Organization for Migration, "The Brain Drain," 2003, [www.iom.int/mida/mida\\_health.shtml](http://www.iom.int/mida/mida_health.shtml).

<sup>152</sup> Wu Jia Huang (Vice-Chair, China WTO Research Center), General Conference of UNIDO, Industrial Development Forum, 28 Nov. 2005, Vienna, [www.unido.org/file\\_storgae/download?file\\_id=46437](http://www.unido.org/file_storgae/download?file_id=46437).

<sup>153</sup> From 1820-1945, the US, to protect itself from and overtake European industrial powers, had average tariffs exceeding 40% on manufactures. Chang Ha-Joon, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem, 2002):29. Applied average tariffs on manufactures in Africa are now 12%. Gobind Nankani, "Enhancing Africa's Development Through an 'Export Push': Prospects and Challenges," 14 Sep. 2005, <http://worldbank.org/wbsite/external/countries/africaext/0,,contentMDK>.

increasing incomes for Chinese, even if rural people's incomes still average only \$1 per day. Another result is more state revenue, including more customs revenue, even though tariffs had been lowered. Increased revenue had allowed for greater social welfare.

Wu called on WTO to remove trade-distorting subsidies to farmers in the North so that farmers in the South can sell their products at a better price. He explained that Chinese farms are very small, having on average .7 hectares of land, compared to US farmers' 200 ha. and Europeans' 20 ha. He also noted that PRC agricultural tariffs averaged 15.8%, compared to 23% in the US and 73% in Europe. Meanwhile, state support for China's farmers was only 1.5% of their income, while in the US it was 18% and in the EU, 33%. The G20 (a group of developing states active in WTO) and China were thus in the same boat in needing cuts in developed world agricultural subsidies.

The PRC official's presentation summed up, for an audience of mainly developing country representatives, several commonly-held conceptions about Chinese economic practices that relate to the perceived distinctiveness of China-Africa links: China provides a model for developing states based on rapid industrialization fueled by a high-level of investment and concentration on exports. Moreover, unlike the West, its low-tariff, low-subsidy regime allows other developing countries to export freely to China and compete with her in world markets. The official thus essentially argued that PRC policymakers are more consistent economic liberals than those of the West and that this greater liberality fulfills the common needs of Chinese and citizens of other developing countries.

Wu did not explain how China's experience of the world's highest rates of savings and its attraction of FDI mainly from co-ethnics on its periphery can be duplicated by most developing states. Nor did he recognize that these states are scarcely positioned to take

advantage of China's economic liberality by competing with PRC producers, either in their domestic market or the world. Still, one point was doubtless attractive and likely convincing: that China, unlike Western states, is not obstructing development in the world's poorer countries. That one point, whether it relates to the BC or to aid and migration, epitomizes the distinctiveness of China-Africa link for many Africans.

It is the practices of Western states associated with past colonialism or present imperialism that make PRC practices appear distinctive to Africans. Most prominent among these are impositions of neo-liberal SAPs that have resulted in diminished growth, huge debt, declining incomes, and curtailed social welfare for most Africans; the use of aid to compel compliance with SAPs and the foreign policies of Western powers; protectionism (despite free trade rhetoric) in developed states that inhibits African exports; and continued support for authoritarian leaders (despite talk of democracy and human rights) in order to secure natural resources and combat everything "radical."

To these points must be added Western disparagement of Africa through an unremitting negative discourse, overlaid with strong implications of African incompetence. The ideas that colonialism, on balance, benefited "the natives" and that Africa's troubles have all been post-colonial are popular among elites of the main Western states. Pundits (more often British or Canadian imports than Americans) often recommend the imperial experience to US power elites. The historian Niall Ferguson, brought from Britain to Harvard, argues "empire is more necessary in the 21<sup>st</sup> century than ever before" because, while British colonialism brought the colonized a beneficent modernity and liberal capitalism, post-colonial states have often been more exploitative, worse for economic growth, and more violent than colonialism. With independence a

disaster for most poor countries, imperial governance in which national sovereignty is suspended for decades should be imposed.<sup>154</sup> That stance is also prominent in British political circles. Then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that “the story of how Europeans explored and colonized – and yes, without apology – civilized much of the world is an extraordinary tale of talent, skill and courage.” Chancellor of the Exchequer (and likely future Prime Minister) Gordon Brown, visiting Africa in 2005, stated “[T]he days of Britain having to apologize for its colonial history are over. We should move forward. We should celebrate much of our past rather than apologize for it.”<sup>155</sup>

The experience of Africans in China has been less than positive due to popular racism, which Chinese in Africa also often display. The PRC government bears some responsibility for it, due to its propagation of Social Darwinism (the more rich the more fit) and representation of Africa as uniformly poor. It is nevertheless careful to recognize the main cause of Africa’s problems as the legacy of colonial depredation.<sup>156</sup> PRC leaders would never term Africa a “hopeless continent.”<sup>157</sup> They (officially at least) celebrate

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<sup>154</sup> Jeet Heer, “Operation Anglosphere,” *Boston Globe*, 23 Mar. 2003:H1; Niall Ferguson, *Empire: the Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* (London: Allen Lane 2003); \_\_\_\_ *Colossus: the Price of America’s Empire* (New York: Penguin 2004); \_\_\_\_ “Africa Doesn’t Need Handouts: it Needs Honest Governments,” DT, 5 February 2005:22.

<sup>155</sup> “Speech to the College of Europe (“The Bruges Speech”), 1988, [www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107](http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107); Benedict Brogan, “It’s Time to Celebrate the Empire says Brown,” *Daily Mail* (London), 15 January 2005:2.

<sup>156</sup> “Quiet Superpower Seduces Africa,” BD, 30 Nov. 2004 (PRC Ambassador to S. Africa on shared experiences of “aggression, plunder and enslavement by colonialists”); Li Xing, “The Power of the Logo: The Implication of the Chinese Revolution for Pan-African Movement,” in Mammo Muchie (ed), *The Making of the Africa-Nation: Pan Africanism and the African Renaissance* (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2003):147-168. A growth in African studies in China has boosted knowledge of African concerns. Li Anshan, “African Studies in China in the Twentieth Century: an Historiographical Survey,” *African Studies Review* 48:1 (2005): 59-87; Han Yonghong, “African Studies in China,” *Tinabantu* 2:1 (2004):51-60.

<sup>157</sup> The cover story, “Africa: the Hopeless Continent,” *Economist*, 14 Apr. 2000, caused much offense in Africa, where it was regarded as reflecting widespread Western elite views.

Africa's culture and achievements,<sup>158</sup> while these are implicitly denigrated in the West, where all that is celebrated about Africa are leaders who hearken to Western advice.

Unlike during the Mao era, China today provides no radical solutions to Africa's predicament and its "neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics" likely provides no solutions at all. The PRC instead avails itself of the historically-determined disadvantages of Africa in trade,<sup>159</sup> although some of what it sells to Africa is useful in developing aspects of industry or affordable consumer goods. While China is different from the West in that a greater proportion of its investment seemingly goes to non-oil sectors, part of the still small PRC investment is imbricated with the continent's harsh labor regimens, in places like the Copperbelt of Zambia.<sup>160</sup> China nevertheless is widely perceived as acting differently from the West in providing some investments of direct benefit beyond elite circles, in not insisting Africa's political economy steer a particular course, and in not draining, but instead contributing to Africa's talent pool. For that reason, neo-conservatives in the US have increasingly expressed alarm about PRC gains in Africa.<sup>161</sup>

It is not clear whether the differences outlined will persist over the long-term. Among major powers at any given time, there are always differences in approach to subordinate states. The very process of differentiating super-ordinate and subordinate states and dominant and subaltern peoples tends over time however to make the conduct of great powers and their elites more similar than different. In a very few years we should be able to determine whether that will be the case as well with China in Africa.

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<sup>158</sup> China's cultural agreements with 46 African states have created hundreds of exchanges. "Cultural Exchanges Promote Sino-African Cooperation," PD, 10 May 2004.

<sup>159</sup> See Jonathan Holslag, "China's New Mercantilism in Central Africa," European Strategic Intelligence & Security Center Briefing Document, 13 Dec. 2005, [www.esisc.org/CHINA.pdf](http://www.esisc.org/CHINA.pdf).

<sup>160</sup> J. Lungu and C. Mulenga, *Corporate Social Responsibility Practices in the Extractive Industry in Zambia* (NIZA Institute for southern African Affairs, 2005), [www.niza.nl/docs/200505301137193579.pdf](http://www.niza.nl/docs/200505301137193579.pdf).

<sup>161</sup> Peter Brookes and Ji Hye Shin, "China's Influence in Africa: Implications for the United States," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #1916 (22 Feb. 2006), [www.heritage.org](http://www.heritage.org).